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Abstract 
This thesis aims to look at how the the northern policies (Nordpolitikk) of governments 
in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia have been affected by processes of continuity and 
change, with regard to the development of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) as a new 
entity. In studying, also, the forces shaping this region's emergence and political direction, the 
Nordpolitikk, especially of Norway, is assessed. 
The paper begins by examining the region geographically, and by explaining the 
changes which Russo-Nordic relations underwent in the final years of the Cold War. The 
effects that changes in the international political climate since have had upon the national 
policies of Northern Europe are also considered, and the reasoning behind the Barents co-
operation scheme is explained both implicitly and explicitly within this context. The 
implications of the nascent 'region' are then discussed, both in terms of economic practicalities 
and political potentialities. From this theoretical basis, aspects of continuity and change 
inherent in the BEAR are subsequently investigated. Key areas (such as economics and the 
environment, their significance for regional confidence and stability, and the interaction 
between the BEAR and wider European and pan-Arctic processes) are analysed. The 
commentary of various contemporary players and interpreters is reassessed, in the light of three 
years of the scheme's operation, changing national and foreign policies, and new internal and 
external threats to the region's future. The role of the Barents Region as a bridge-builder 
between Russia and Wes tern Europe is then reviewed, as is the BEAR' s ( co-)operative 
potential. 
The concluding section aims to reflect upon whether or not the Barents co.:operation 
structure genuinely responds to changing needs. The division between military/security and 
civilian goals is considered, as the question is posed whether the BEAR can ultimately become 
anything more than a mere puppet for the continuation of national policies, and what chance it 
has for wider recognition. Finally, the remaining implications of the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Region are debated, as its role is assessed between North, South, East and West. 
v . 
"The only opportunity for a region to bring itself to bear on the European space is through 
interdependencies which extend beyond the national perspective" 
Former President of Baden-Wtirttemberg, Lothar Spat, 1992 (quoted in Wiberg, 1994: p.30). 
1.0 General Introduction 
'Paths are walked, which have earlier been set foot on' 
(Scandinavian proverb) 
The Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) is a newly-established economic, political and 
security-based co-operation zone spanning much of the Arctic sector of the European continent, 
and in circumpolar terms involves four of the eight so-called 'lee States'. It is considered by 
some as a model form of regional development and East-West foreign policy relations, as three 
of the wealthiest Western nations have committed themselves to the transformation of a small 
but important part of the former state-controlled Soviet Union. 
Three years into the scheme, the BEAR has met with relatively little criticism. On the 
other hand, it is no longer viewed in the optimistic light of its launch. Changes in local, 
regional, national and international circumstances have inevitably affected the development of 
the BEAR. Simultaneously, Nordpolitikkl has been used in both domestic and foreign policy 
in order to reflect such change. What the resultant Barents structure implies in terms of Nordic 
relations, core and periphery relations, North-South relations, and state-indigenous political 
behaviour, are, therefore, very topical and important issues. A critical examination of the 
nature, direction and future prospects of the BEAR, has (as far as the author is aware) seldom 
been attempted, and nor has any realistic assessment between the elements of inherent change 
and continuity. This paper searches for insights into these and related issues - as to how the 
military utilisation of the North has influenced the preconditions for Arctic co-operation in non-
military issues in the post-Cold War period, what the dominant features of such relations are, 
and how they have altered - through understanding the establishment, popularising and 
operation of the BEAR in an appropriate context. 
As is commonly the case in any border area, efforts to deal with regional problems in 
Northern Europe are embedded in political processes outside the region itself. It is for this 
reason, that although it is the BEAR which provides the focus for this paper, the governance 
even of relatively remote areas of Europe cannot be divorced from the wider perspective. 
'Nordpolitikk' is a Norwegian word, although it is a policy adhered to, at least in spirit, in each of the 
Nordic countries. It is apt for the purposes of this thesis, not only because Norway was instrumental in the 
formation of the BEAR, but also because the Norwegians use their northern territory and northern problems as 
an essential part of a wider policy-making process, as the following chapters endeavour to explain. By 
definition, Nordpolitikk should include Svalbard, but this is not a part of the Barents Region, and for long has 
been an anomaly in governance, hence will not be considered as part of this work. 
1 
International relations have changed in the Arctic as they have changed worldwide in the wake 
,. of the Cold War. The degree to which things have changed at ground level, both very 
suddenly, and historically, however, is something which remains to be assessed. The 
paradoxes of long-term continuity and short-term change will therefore be borne out in this 
paper, in the course of studying the Barents Euro-Arctic Region. 
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Map 1: Northern Europe. Fenno-Scandinavia, Russia, and the member counties of the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) (adapted from British Admiralty Charts, 1995) 
2.0 The Barents Euro-Arctic Region 
2.1 Geography 
The Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) covers an enormous area, and an understanding 
of its geography is essential in any study of the region (see Map 1). It stretches from the remote 
Arctic islands of Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya, south to the tundra of the Nenets 
Autonomous District of North-Western Russia, westwards across the taiga of Archangelsk, 
Karelia, Finnish Lappland and northernmost Sweden, and across to the Atlantic coast of Northern 
Norway. The area covers more than 1.2 million square kilometres (ie. five times the area of the 
UK), over half of which is in Archangelsk Oblast. Practically all of this territory lies North of the 
Arctic Circle, even if not all of it qualifies as ecologically or geographically polar. Nonetheless, in 
European terms, it is a unique area, distinctive as much in its natural assets as in its weather and 
environment. Yet barely 4.5 million people live in the region, and, of these, some 3.6 million 
inhabit the industrial towns of the Russian North, in, for example Murmansk and Archangelsk 
(Godal, 1995b) (see Table 1 and Map 2). 
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Map 2: Population distribution and urban concentration in the Barents Region 
(Barentssekretariatet, 1994: p.5) 
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Straddling the former divide between Russia and Scandinavia2, between a poor, 
· disillusioned East and an affluent West, and connecting a state still in transition to market 
economy democracies, the BEAR has seen a high degree of political energy and commitment 
invested in its operation. This may be all the more surprising, given that this was probably the 
world's most sensitive military confrontation zone only a decade ago. It still contains the 
world's largest stocks of strategic nuclear forces, and therefore remains an area of some 
political sensitivity. The all-round operational success of any cross-border co-operation in 
such a region can therefore develop only through great political trust. This can by no means be 
guaranteed in an area of such great cultural and economic heterogeneity, even when its vast 
natural resources give the Barents region significant future potential. 
The region is believed to be rich in unexploited minerals, forests, fish stocks, gas and 
oil, and prospects for economic growth and prosperity in the region as a whole are therefore 
good. The population, military and industrial activity are largely concentrated towards the 
coast. At the same time, the Barents region covers some of the last wilderness areas in Europe. 
But it is also a climatic zone highly vulnerable to pollutants, as weak wintertime ocean 
circulation in the Barents Sea, coupled with cold temperatures to hinder evaporation, in tum 
reduces bacteriological breakdown. Combined with acid deposition, oil spills, and Russia's 
poor nuclear safety record, environmental problems are a prime characteristic of the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Region. 
Table 1: Population by member county of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region 
(Barentssekretariatet, 1994: p.3) 
Are~ 
l.appiand C<>unty 
Finnmark County 
Nordland County 
Troms County 
Arkhangelsk ounty 
Murmansk County 
IRep,unMic @f IKarelfa, 
Nortbott~n County 
Tola! 
Population Area Ckm?l 
202 000 99000 
76000 46000 
240000 36000 
149 000 25000 
l 561000 587000 
1135 000 145000 
'i'l~OOO 172000 
266 000 99000 
4 42'1000 1209 000 
2 By definition, 'Scandinavia' comprises only of Noiway and Sweden. Politically and culturally, however, it 
includes the other three Nordic countries, Finland, Denmark, Iceland (and the Faeroes). Thus Fenno-
Scand(inav)ia will be used in this paper where absolute clarity is required, although, generally, Scandinavia will 
be taken to mean the three Nordic countries with which we are dealing, ie. Noiway, Sweden and Finland, which 
can also collectively be referred in this context as Norden, ( even if this word, which literally means 'the North', 
can sometimes also be extended to include Iceland). See also Map 3 (ahead). 
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Among the inhabitants, language, standards of living, religion, political culture and 
. historical experience differ markedly. The region is home to several ethnic groups, for, in 
addition to the Swedes, Finns, Russians and Norwegians, there are indigenous peoples, such 
as the Saami (who live in the North of all four countries), and the Nenets and Komi of NW 
Russia. In the Karelian Republic live several Finno-Ugric minorities. At least nine different 
languages are spoken in the region, added to which complexity, national minorities live in all 
four countries. This fact can be reflected in local place names, trades and customs. Indeed, 
Murman is Russian for Norwegian (Schram Stokke, 1994c: p.27). 
A permanent national frontier in the region was established to divide the former joint 
Swedish/Norwegian and Russian territories as recently as 1826, although, by the middle of the 
19th century, the mere delineation of a national border had transformed the area into two 
divergent economic zones. Mekhalin, the Russian Consul-General to Christiania3 in 1848, 
could only ascribe the disparity to the difference in the efforts governments made to encourage 
exploitation. For Norwegian Finnmark was bustling with activity and prosperity from fishing, 
roadbuilding, steamship and telegraph services construction, while the Russian Murmansk 
coast remained virtually unpopulated (Nielsen, 1992: p.2). Since then, despite a history of 
strong trading links (at least until the 1917 Russian Revolution), there had been minimal East-
West integration in the Barents Region until the dissolution of the USSR. Different political 
systems in the Communist East and capitalist West were reinforced by differences m 
currencies, laws and trading practices. 
Today, three and a half years into the Barents Region project, there still remain noticeable 
disparities. However, given that some of the most peripheral regions of four different countries 
are involved, this can hardly be surprising. The aim of the BEAR was not to transform the 
region instantly, but to work towards creating a sustainable and co-operative zonal entity. 
When the governments of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia met to put the scheme into 
operation, they knew that planning for a new future together would not be straightforward. In 
the wake of the Cold War, and suffering from the cutbacks in associated military spending, the 
European Arctic still faces a barrage of problems. But the BEAR was instigated as the tool by 
which it was hoped that these problems could be solved. Hence it is to the foundation of the 
BEAR, the changes in northern policy, and the ways in which the four governments have 
attempted to deal with the specific problems of the post-Cold War world, that we now tum. 
3 From 1380-1814, Norway was part of the joint kingdom of Denmark and Norway. From 1814-1904, Norway 
was part of Sweden. Christiania was the former name for Oslo, 1624-1924, in honour of King Christian IV. 
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2.2 The Kirkenes Declaration 
In the Spring of 1992, when the Baltic Sea Region was being established, the Foreign 
Ministers of Russia, Norway and Finland agreed to meet early in the following year, in order 
to discuss a framework for regional co-operation in the European Arctic. They sought to 
replace the era of Cold War hostility with an active form of partnership to promote peace and 
stability, as democratisation in the former Soviet Union, combined with American economic 
retrenchment and military 'right-sizing', put pressure on Scandinavia to assume greater 
responsibility for her own defence (Kvistad, 1994: p.73). Similarly, it followed attempts 
dating back to the 1950s, between France and Germany, first to build confidence, and later, 
mutual interdependence, in what has now become the European Union (Stoltenberg, 1994: 
p.xi). Linking the northernmost parts of Russia and Fenno-Scandia would, it was believed, 
similarly aid development on both sides of the former Iron Curtain, as positive contacts and 
governmental backing could start to replace Cold War suspicions and mutual distrust, to 
promote mutual economic growth, to satisfy the demands and expectations of each country's 
Arctic inhabitants, and thereby to reduce the risk of economic strife and future conflict (ibid.). 
The BEAR came into being the following year, when, on 11th January 1993, at 
Kirkenes, in North-Eastern Norway, the Declaration on Co-operation in the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Region was formally signed by Russia, the five Nordic countries and the European Union 
(Commission)4 (see Fig. 1 ). The Kirkenes Declaration established a forum for considering 
bilateral and multilateral co-operation in the fields of economy, trade, science and technology, 
tourism, the environment, infrastructure, educational and cultural exchange, as well as projects 
particularly aimed at improving the situation of the indigenous peoples in the North. 
The BEAR was unique. It was "a political instrument designed to normalise relations 
across the former East-West divide in the North" (Godal, 1995b) through combining both an 
intergovernmental (Barents Council) and an interregional (Regional Council) sector (see Fig. 
2), therein reflecting the intent of state governments to retain a decisive say in its operation, and 
to ensure better political control of developments in the region, particularly with regard to the 
balance between safeguarding the environment and exploiting natural resources (Schram 
Stokke & Tunander, 1994_: p.3). 
4 The participation of the European Union (EU) (previously known as the European Community (EC)) in an 
international agreement requires a decision by the Council of Ministers, on a proposal emanating from the 
Commission. In the case of the Kirkenes Declaration, which is not a formal agreement, the Commission 
signed in its own _name, although for the purposes of this paper, as well as at a regional level, it is taken to 
represent the European Union per se. 
7 
Figure 1: Signing the Kirkenes Declaration, 11th January 1993: the Foreign Ministers of the Barents Council 
(Barentssekretariatet, 1994: p.4) 
The Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (Barents Council of Ministers) is 
comprised of government representatives from the seven signatory powers, but observer status 
was granted to Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, since it was felt that the efforts needed, particularly in the 
environmental field, warranted international participation. Norway, whose government had 
designed the BEAR, therefore stood to gain political respectability, and was the first of the four 
core countries to take the chair. 
The second layer, the Regional Council5, is the real 'engine' of the scheme. The 
Council is responsible for initiating projects and releasing the potential for development that the 
new structure implies. Also integral to the treaty was the expressed aim that development 
should adhere to EU policy. The Council consists of representatives of the three North 
Norwegianfylker (counties), Nordland, Troms and Finnmark, the northernmost Swedish and 
Finnish liin, Norbotten and Lappland, the Russian oblasti (provinces) of Murmansk and 
Archangelsk, and the Russian constituent republic of Karelia. There is also a delegate to 
represent the Saami. 
5 Decisions made by the central bodies are based on priorities and assessments made at the regional level. At 
the same time, the regional bodies implement the priorities made at the central level , ie. in the Barents Council, 
from the Committee of Senior Officials when the Barents Council is not convened, and also from national 
governments. Fo,r a complete explanation of the BEAR's operative system, the reader is referred to the 
publications produced by the Barents Secretariat (Barentssekretariatet, 1994). 
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Under the Communist system, the Scandinavian Saami were permitted few links with 
. their Russian counterparts, thus only with the collapse of the former Soviet Union have 
transnational links been developed, to enable these people to speak with one voice. It is not 
hard to see that the BEAR itself similarly owes its existence to such change, since regional 
integration across the Iron Curtain would have been unthinkable. On the other hand, politically 
limited co-operation between East and West certainly was not unprecedented. 
Figure 2: The structure and official bodies of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region 
(Barentssekretariatel, 1994: p.8) 
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3.0 Changing political relations and the emergence of international 
co-operation in the Barents region 
3.1 Glasnost 
By the mid-1980s, it had become apparent to both East and West that new measures 
were needed to break the Cold War deadlock and to counter the expense of growing 
militarisation in the Arctic. Since real security requires mutual trust, respect and 
interdependence, disarmament alone was no panacea. This is why the Soviets came to favour a 
comprehensive approach to security (Granovsky, 1989: p.216). There appeared to be two 
alternatives: either an integrated conception of Arctic security, in the form of combining the 
military threat with the environmental, social and economic ones; or the building of non-
military co-operation, on the basis that conflict in one issue area need not preclude co-operation 
in another, and that non-military co-operation can help reduce military-strategic relations 
(0streng, 1992; p.26). 
Thus it was, that traces of collaboration across the Barents area were discernible early 
on in the Gorbachev era, since regional and pan-Arctic co-operation formed part of the basis 
for the watershed in Soviet foreign policy outlined by the Communist Party General Secretary 
in his speech in Murmansk, in October 1987. 
This 'Murmansk Initiative' foreshadowed a whole series of reforms in Soviet foreign 
policy, as the Kremlin came to recognise its ailing grip on state and society. Previously, the 
security of the Soviet nation was the insecurity of others. Then Gorbachev introduced a clearer 
distinction between military and civilian security, and singled out science, resource exploitation 
and shipping as areas suitable for Arctic co-operation. Both types of security were considered 
vital, but, for the first time in the post-war period, the civilian component was. given an 
independent position. 
Despite this, the Soviets still found it hard to divorce the idea of Scandinavia from the 
West as a whole, when NATO's military presence in Norway was still growing one year after 
the Reykjavfk Treaty (Gorbachev, 1987: p.28). Yet the third of Gorbachev's six tentative 
reforms for the region included "peaceful co-operation in developing the resources of the 
North", albeit largely through private initiatives. Although it startled many Western diplomats, 
the speech paved the way for policy-makers to begin to think about joint co-operation projects: 
Gorbachev had outlined the USSR's willingness "for relevant talks with other states ... [and] 
for co-operation in utilising the resources of the Kola Peninsula... The main thing is to 
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conduct affairs so that the climate is determined by the warm Gulf Stream of the European 
process and not by the polar chill of accumulated suspicions and prejudices" (Gorbachev, 
1987: p.30). 
This is not to argue that Gorbachev in any way proposed the Barents scheme, but his 
words did usher in a new era in regional relations, which thereafter may be seen as part of an 
evolving trend. At the same time, it may be argued that the Barents Region itself was little 
more than the logical geographical and functional extension into Russia of the Fenno-Scandic 
North Calotte6 co-operation, already fostering the idea that the Northern hinterlands were 
being united by their very difference to the South. There remained also the fact that the Pomor7 
(ie. coastal) trading era was not long past, and survived strongly as a memory in Archangelsk 
Oblast, whereas most inhabitants of Murmansk had migrated northwards only since 1917, 
(hence many in Archangelsk still used the Pomar era as an important frame of reference when 
judging the behaviour of foreigners) (Castberg et al., 1994: p.72). On each side of the former 
divide, therefore, there were meaningful precedents for a new regional structure. 
In 1988, it was agreed that Soviet autarky was to be supplemented by international co-
operation and co-ordination. First came joint oceanographic research, at least partly because of 
the military advantage in learning what an opponent knows and thinks in areas of mutual 
strategic relevance (0streng, 1989: p.121). But the Soviet government may also have been 
wanting to expand the range of themes for collaboration, in order to improve credibility for its 
policies of rapprochement. It was, therefore, less an instance of 'if you can't beat them, join 
them', than a wish to co-operate because the political gains would outweigh the military 
disadvantages. 
The other motive for change was economic. Reductions in defence expenditure were 
required alongside better external relations, if the Soviet economy was to be held together. Oil 
being the USSR's most important export item, the prospective development of the offshore 
oilfields, in the Barents Sea, greatly concerned Moscow. Witnessing Norway's exploratory 
drillings, and facing difficulties in their own technology and management, the Soviets realised 
that the successful development of the offshore oil industry in the Barents Sea would only be 
6 The North Calotte is comprised solely of the Nordic sector of the BEAR, which it predates (see Chapter 3.2). 
7 The Pomar trade between Russian and Norwegian coastal merchants was permitted by the rulers of Russia and 
Norway because of its ability to generate wealth in some of the most inaccessible parts of each kingdom. It was 
this same process, however, which built up levels of mutual distrust between Russia and Norway, as each 
believed the other was increasing its power base in the region ready for territorial annexation. Pomor trading 
therefore declined immediatelv after the Russian Revolution. For a full discussion of the Barents Region's 
Pomor history, th~ reader is dir~cted to the work of J.P. Nielsen, 1992, 1994 (see Bibliography). 
11 
0 
"' 
\ ' 
./ ''~ 
,, 
Map 3: Northern Europe. The North Calotte (Nordkalotten), Great Calotte (Storkalotten ), and 
the concept of Norden (adapted from British Admiralty Charts, 1995) 
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possible with Western co-operation. 
Hoping, therefore, to hasten a solution to the security and co-operation problem in the 
North, Nikolai Ryzhkov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, visited Stockholm and Oslo in January 
1988 to propose reductions in military activity, and to announce for the first time that the 
Barents Sea could be included in the zone of confidence-building measures (Deryabin, 1988: 
p.38). Bearing in mind the disputed continental shelf between Russia and Norway, this 
suggested that Soviet attitudes towards co-operation were changing. 
Although the Murmansk Speech had picked out Norway as one of the likeliest sources 
for external co-operation, the Norwegian government declined Ryzhkov's proposals for an 
offshore 'special zone of partnership' (Scrivener, 1989: pp.40-41). Such a zone would have 
reduced the incentive to solve the ongoing maritime dispute, and would have put Moscow in a 
much better position to assert Russia's might in the area (thereby altering the Western presence, 
and possibly forcing Norway to downgrade NATO surveillance) (ibid.). Norway made it clear 
that any civilian responses to Murmansk would be much enhanced by settling the boundary 
issue. The USSR, however, could not afford the political backlash at a time when the West 
was already perceived as having too much influence. There was, consequently, no solution. 
Almost without precedent, however, the first agreements were signed on functional co-
operation. With glasnost and perestroika the spirit of the age, the policies of the North 
European states had had to adapt to a changing geopolitics. Obtaining, then, the correct 
balance between continuity and change, was what would prove fundamental to successful co-
operation. 
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3.2 Nordic, Baltic and Pan-Arctic Co-operation 
There had, perhaps inevitably, been some degree of co-operation in Arctic Europe 
before, but by the late 1980s, there were only three multilateral regimes in existence which 
involved the signatories of the Barents Council8. There had been several Soviet-Norwegian 
bilateral agreements on search and rescue operations ( 19.56), on sealing regulations ( 1957), and 
in scientific-technological co-operation ( 1988). But co-operation had never stretched any 
further (Slipchenko, 1989: pp.101-2). 
Norway had always trodden carefully in her ties with Moscow and Washington, lest on 
the one hand she be isolated diplomatically, or on the other she be perceived by NATO as 
doing what she should not. Norway was, therefore, keen to multilateralise links when it came 
to the BEAR, both to bring in foreign aid and expertise and to avoid Russian domination, even 
though the Nordic nations had traditionally acted, and had been regarded, as a bloc of their 
own (Norden - see Map 3 ). For Norden, the BEAR would provide the first real opportunity to 
face militarised Russia in a non-military way, and without Russian dominance or Scandinavian 
dependence, because of the broader policies and involvement that the newly-internationalised 
Arctic region provided (Scrivener, 1996, pers. comm.). 
Already, at the outset of the BEAR, Norway's efforts to influence Russian policy had 
passed through three identifiable stages: first, the preparatory, at county-level, when meetings 
began in the glasnost era; secondly, scientific co-ordination, following the Murmansk Speech 
and the 1988 Leningrad Conference (which forged strong ties between bureaucrats as well as 
scientists); and thirdly, politicisation, with a concomitant growth in public interest in such co-
operation. This stage was heralded in 1990, with Norway's pledge of NoK300 million for the 
modernisation of the Nikel works in Russia (Schram Stokke, 1994b: pp.19-20). 
It was also immediately after the Murmansk Speech that a number of bilateral 
agreements were signed with the USSR, to give rise to what has since been dubbed the 'Arctic 
Boom'. The West naturally seized this opportunity to develop closer co-operative ties with the 
USSR, partly out of self-interest, and partly to foster stability (which may also be viewed as 
self-interest) (Lock, 1996, pers. comm.). National responsibilities were multilateralised, and 
no longer limited to simple mutual benefits and convenience (ibid.). It was in this way that a 
8 These were: the 1911 Fur Seals Treaty (subsequently updated), the 1925 Svalbard Treaty, and the International 
Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears. In addition, there were a number of scientific organisations, cg. 
the International Permafrost Association, and the International Union of Circumpolar Health (Slipchcnko, 
1989: p.98) . 
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Norwegian-Soviet Joint Environmental Commission was established in 1988 (since when it 
has served as the primary means of co-ordination between the respective environmental 
ministries). Russia and Finland also signed a co-operation agreement in September 1990, this 
time at both inter-:state and inter-regional level. Military-strategic preoccupations may have 
remained dominant at this point, in an atmosphere of some continued distrust. But it was as a 
natural continuation of the co-operative (environmental) trend from which arose, at least in 
part, the mechanics of the BEAR. 
Initially, it had been Finland, with her well-founded relations both East and West, that 
had paved the way towards a new era of co-operation. In 1989, the Finnish government 
launched its environmental 'Rovaniemi Initiative', following which, in August 1990, an 
International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) was established to facilitate scientific co-
operation, with an accompanying multilateral Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme 
(AMAP), and followed by the adoption of an Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
(AEPS). This was an attempt to deal with the same environmental problematique as the 
BEAR, but in a geographically wider (and functionally narrower) approach. Then, in May 
1992, negotiations commenced, to establish an international Arctic Council. This was to be a 
body in which to discuss common issues and to promote circumpolar co-operation. 
At a territorial level, however, co-operation amongst governments had already begun in 
November 1991, with the launch of the Northern Forum for consultations on cultural, 
environmental, social and economic issues, thereby aiming to promote a 'Northern dialogue', 
and to identify areas of trans-regional and pan-Arctic interest in order to aid future co-operation 
(Gizewski, 1993: p.6). Collaboration, therefore, must have reflected a widely acknowledged 
polar perspective on civil co-operation in the Arctic, as a distinct sense of regional political 
community began to emerge on the basis of location, common needs and concerns. · 
This sense of regional community already existed in Northern Scandinavia, however, 
in the area known as the Nordkalotten (North Calotte). Such Nordic co-operation also pre-
dates Arctic multilateralism, in being founded on a common cultural heritage and decades of 
collaboration. In the late 1940s, for example, there were plans made for a Scandinavian 
defence alliance (which never materialised). A Nordic Council was established in 1953, to deal 
with questions of law, economics, society and culture, and discussions were even begun in 
1968-70 for a 'Nordec' economic alliance. Then the Nordic Council established a North 
Calotte Committee in 1972, to concentrate on Nordic issues pertaining to the Arctic, and, much 
more recently, there has been a Nordic Passport Union. 
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Yet Norden was far from being united. Economically and militarily, Norway had been 
strongly orientated towards Great Britain and the United States since WWII (see Maps 4 and 
5); Sweden was politically non-aligned and economically tuned towards Germany; and Finland 
had had to balance her dependence on the Russians with equal ties to the West. But the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, in Autumn 1991, forced Scandinavian governments to 
reformulate their foreign (and, by implication, northern) policies, so that, despite their different 
approaches, the Nordic countries had far more in common than separated them. There was, 
therefore, never any theoretical objection to extending Nordic co-operation principles to the 
Barents Region. Indeed, in the author's opinion, and since the Nordic Saami Council had 
already widened its membership into the Kola Peninsula in 1990, it was perhaps therefore 
inevitable that wider political co-operation would follow, in what politicians now termed the 
Storkalotten (Great Calotte) region. 
The most obvious precedent for the BEAR, however, came from the Baltic Sea Region. 
Established in Copenhagen in March 1992, this new international forum was designed in the 
wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, to deal with the economic, infrastructural and 
environmental problems of the Baltic countries, as a kind of Germano-Scandinavian 'clean-up 
operation' (Tunander, 1994: p.35). With Russian politicians seeking to replace the discredited 
Soviet ideology, a reborn Hanseatic League9 . could refocus doubts and boost the new 
government's prestige, whilst providing a wide roof under which the problems between the ex-
Soviet states could be diluted. Sweden and Finland were keen members - in fact, Finland had 
already considered extending the scheme to the Barents region (Kvistad, 1994: p.96). Norway 
was also a signatory, for although she is without Baltic coastline, she had no desire to become 
marginalised. But Norwegian political attention was turning to the High North, since, for her, 
the Baltic was only of minimal economic or political relevance. Norway had thus by then 
realised that she needed a unique approach to European affairs if she was to improve her 
regional (and, therein, international) status. 
By the early 1990s, the Nordic Council was already recommending that Nordic 
governments take initiatives to establish an Arctic regime, to promote comprehensive 
intergovernmental co-operation in resource, environmental and security issues (Scrivener, 
1996: p.5). But the Arctic rim states were not in favour of any regulatory international 
environmental regimes, nor the surrender of any sovereignty. The dissolution of the USSR 
9 The Hanseatic Le.ague ('Hansa') was a confederation of trading cities with a monopoly in Baltic commerce, and 
existed in the days before nation states, from the twelfth century to 1669. 
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had thrown Nordic relations into a flux and an atmosphere of increasing distrust, thus the need 
. to stabilise relations became increasingly apparent. There was, for example, suspicion in Oslo 
that Finland's Initiative sought to gain influence over Norwegian resources policy in the 
Barents Sea (ibid.:p.7). It was, therefore, through further developing the perceived need for 
co-operation, and in harnessing the growth of links between scientists, indigenous people's 
and other organisations within states with those of territorial governments - ie. 
transnationalisation - that the idea for the Barents Region was soon to be born (Scrivener, 
1996: p.3). 
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3.3 The reasoning behind the BEAR 
Understanding the reasoning behind the BEAR is essential in assessing the nature of 
northern policy. The Nordic states had a number of important reasons for favouring increased 
co-operation in the Barents Region in the wake of the Cold War, as did post-Soviet Russia. 
When Russia declared independence in the Summer of 1990, President Yeltsin tried to 
fonnulate a foreign policy independent from that of the USSR. However, this policy met with 
heavy internal criticism almost immediately. Although nothing had been resolved by the time 
of the Kirkenes Declaration, either towards the Euro-Arctic region, or the Nordic countries 
themselves (Jonson, 1994: p.167), Foreign Minister Kozyrev lent his support to his 
Norwegian counterpart's plans for the BEAR in March 1992, and the Russian government has 
repeatedly stated its support for the scheme ever since. Indeed, the newspaper Izvestia 
heralded the 1993 Declaration as "a prototype of a future system of inter-related co-operation 
zones stretching from the Barents Sea through ... Europe" (12 January 1993, quoted in Jonson, 
ibid.). 
For the Scandinavian governments as a whole, the underlying motivation in the BEAR 
was to remove the environmental and security threat. The Barents policy was one of pursuing 
national interests pragmatically, which, for Norway, as initiator of the scheme, meant that her 
Nordpolitikk must fit such Realpolitik goals. Together, the Nordic states sought to aid Kola in 
its ecological problems, since transboundary pollution issues - nuclear dangers, acid 
deposition, marine hazards - could not be addressed without the active participation of Russia. 
Norden also sought to develop confidence-building measures, to encourage greater long-term 
regional stability. Hence the BEAR could simultaneously become the superstructure for 
economic development at the national, regional and international level (Hoel, 1993: p.43). 
Furthermore, Stoltenberg always emphasised that such regional co-operation was an integral 
part of Norway's European policy. 
In a country extending from the Kola Peninsula to the European Union (see Map 4), 
Norwegian foreign and internal policies had to fit hand in hand. Norway was doubling as a 
window to NW Russia for the EU, as well as a window to Western Europe for the Russians. 
With Sweden and Finland also poised for EU membership at the time, it was no longer 
satisfactory to allow market forces dictate the rate of economic transition in the European 
Arctic. Neither Communism nor the West's military spending levels appeared likely to 
resume, and, therefore, alternative investment had to be found. Amongst the Nordic foreign 
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policy elite, moreover, there was concern over Nordic marginalization unless there was 
positive action in Northern Europe (since the EU distracts the political and economic attention 
of key players like Germany or Great Britain, while the USA was streamlining its political and 
military presence in the European Arctic). 
Linking East and West in Arctic Europe thus seemed a useful instrument. It would, the 
Foreign Minister said, provide a new forum for dialogue between Brussels and Moscow 
(Stoltenberg, 1994: p.viii). It would also provide a basis for a North European dimension to 
any future common foreign or security policy in the EU, and would serve as a useful common 
ground for Nordic ministers in the run-up to EU integration. Finally, involvement in the 
BEAR would be a useful learning experience for Brussels, not just as an East-West co-
operation pilot scheme, but also a North-South one, for it prepared to re-extend the Union's 
reach into the Arctic for the first time since 1985, when Greenland had withdrawn her 
membership. 
The BEAR was thus, at once, a basis for EC Nordpolitikk, and Norway's dowry for 
the EU. The Commission's enthusiasm for it was largely due to the EU representative in Oslo, 
who several times tried to obtain policy direction from Brussels, but who ultimately received 
no guidelines (Archer, 1996, pers. comm.). The European Union's involvement would 
strengthen Norway's application for EU membership (in providing new possibilities for 
finance and political clout), further to Norwegian oil and fish production (which were not such 
enticing prospects). Archer believes there was also a tacit understanding that terrestrial success 
would allow future incorporation of the Barents Sea (and hence its resources) within the 
Barents Region, provided there was agreement regarding jurisdiction (ibid.). 
Moreover, the North has always played an important role also in Norwegian domestic 
regional policy, and regional co-operation justified an opportunity to allocate more re·sources to 
the three northernmost counties, not least in research and education. Regional policy has 
become almost as important as international policy for Oslo, and not least because the BEAR 
had the potential to tie domestic questions into the EU structure ( eg. through regional aid to old 
military bases). Certain issues in the North-South debate could therefore be solved, as, at one 
stroke, the government also appeared to be doing something constructive for the indigenous 
minority (especially in the light of notorious Saami protests in Norway in the early 1980s) 
whilst countering the widespread belief amongst the Norwegian population that the EU would 
be harmful for northern livelihoods (which many Norwegians regard as their living heritage, 
and, therefore, _particularly opposed the EU's policies towards fishing, whaling and sealing 
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(Hoel, 1996, pers. comm.)). It was not simply coincidental, therefore, that the EU 
membership referendum results should show significant disparities within all three 
Scandinavian countries in voting trends between North and South,just as they were split urban 
to rural (see Appendix). 
In Finland and Sweden, the BEAR was supposed to provide the means to uphold 
regional development schemes in the North, whilst meeting the criteria necessary in 
withdrawing public intervention from less prosperous districts, as domestic competition was 
being eliminated in the run up to EU admission. This also dovetailed with the retrenchment 
philosophy of the new coalition Swedish government, which sought to make peripheries 
'bridges for integration', whilst labour and service markets were encouraged to 'go it alone' 
(Wiberg, 1993: pp.30-1). 
Finally, there were further domestic issues in Scandinavian politics that had to be 
addressed in the wake of the Cold War, when it became clear that national security policy (in 
the form of government investment in military infrastructure) could no longer be maintained as 
a means of regional policy. Those in the North, dependent upon a defence economy, were 
often, therefore, hostile to conversion. There was also internal government opposition against 
entering co-operation arrangements with Russia, particularly within the Norwegian Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs. Stoltenberg only quelled this with a succession of Ambassadorial postings 
overseas. There was, thus, very little which would prevent northern policy from being 
reformulated, lest the all-too-peripheral status of the North Calotte be reinforced. A distinct 
new Nordpolitikk, it was felt, should have certain principles. Its aim should be to reflect and 
respect the interests and aspirations of northern inhabitants; to involve these people fully; to 
develop in a sustainable manner; and to ensure peaceful civil relations through mutual, co-
operative security measures. It was aimed to achieve this, at least in part, through the BEAR. 
22 
4.0 The academic and practical concept of the Political Region 
The Barents Euro-Arctic Region evidently combines multifaceted national goals, 
through both internal (northern) policies, and the wider trends of regionalism (the activities of 
region-forming forces in society) and regionalization (deliberate region-forming imposed by 
states). Just as the state needs the region as an instrument of national development, and for 
foreign policy goals, so the region needs the state for economic and political support, in order 
to pave the way for regional development (Nilsen, 1994: p.21 ). 
To date, three distinct types or stages of region have been identified: the minimal; the 
co-ordinate (which co-ordinates state behaviour through multilateral actions, and has region-
wide plans to structure development, and regulate its impact socially and physically) and the 
integration region (where a regional community and recognised identity are forming, and 
loyalties and effective jurisdiction are transferred to regional institutions designed to co-ordinate 
policy, thereby restraining individual states' independent action) (Griffiths, 1989: pp.3-4). 
The BEAR, therefore, may currently be viewed as a co-ordinate region, although different 
interpretations exist with respect to its success, and it is topical for academics to debate the 
viability of effective Barents regional integration ( cf. Nilsen, 1994: p.26; Kakonen, 1996: 
pp.72-86). 
Regionalization, which is perhaps the natural result of regionalism, is a long-term 
process, and one driven by such subjective factors as the sense of a common identity, history 
or culture, as well as such objective ones as economics or geopolitics (Mottola, 1996: p.10). 
As a policy and a phenomenon, regionalism is an integral part of today's international relations, 
since spatial patterns and political processes are no longer contained within national 
boundaries. From such a basis, scholars cite seven prime factors necessary within 
interregional co-operation: a prerequisite is geographical contiguity, with its implicit common 
cultural values; secondly, an economic network and a basis of information exchange; thirdly, 
the aim to use common resources to stimulate regional co-operation (to avoid diseconomies, on 
the one hand, or free riding, on the other). Fourthly, there are specific thresholds or 
economies of scale in terms of universities, airports, &c. Fifthly, interregional co-operation 
• . . . . JY,,cc:~.f!l' . 
may be necessary m order to av01d wasteful competition between reg10ns; co-operation 
I\. 
schemes may also influence transaction costs within the new region (eg. in terms of 
information flow, dismantling trade barriers, and establishing joint trade fairs). Lastly, 
interregional co-operation may be used to influence the political and economic bargaining 
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power of constituents in their relations with an external enemy or counterpart, and in the face of 
other regions (eg. nationally or continentally) (Cappellin 1992: pp.13-14). The Barents Region 
appears to show signs of all these, which implies that co-operation is genuinely working. 
In the 1990s, in the wake of the Cold War, Europe is experiencing new trends in cross-
boundary links between adjacent territories (Schram Stokke & Tunander, 1994: p.3 ). Regional 
players are, for example, attempting to engage in forms of transnational co-operation not 
necessarily orchestrated by state authorities. Regions emerge within and between countries 
with previously distinct borders - and not just in the Barents or Baltic areas (see Map 6). As 
Veggeland points out (1994: p.203), this new desire for decentralisation in (inter)national 
politics is based on a need to establish a wider decision base for the electorate, with more 
efficient problem-solving and project-initiating apparatus. Transferring both responsibility and 
capital to regional players is therefore supposed to have a dynamic effect, since it ought 
automatically to engender the mobilisation of local forces as soon as it is implemented. 
Map 6: The new regions of Central and Northern Europe (Veggeland, 1994: p.205) 
This process appears to represent the transformation of the European political scene into 
an increasingly centre-less entity with rather weak external borders, structured between the EU, 
nations themselves, and regional formations in "a complementary, rather than supplementary 
nature ... [thus] constituted around a simultaneous occurrence of competition and dependence, 
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unity and diversity" (Joenniemi, 1994: pp.222-3). The wish to create a Barents region is, to a 
large extent, therefore, a question of demand for regional visibility in the face of competition, 
alongside the fact that the northern tip of Europe has frequently been 'missing' in talk of the 
European continent (Kazantseva & Westin, 1994: p.106). 
Foreign Minister Holst saw that, "in shaping the new Europe, we shall need to develop 
a wider community than that of the nation state [but] to supplement a framework for individual 
states, not to replace them" (1993: p.50). The Barents scheme was thus to be a European 
venture with political leverage, with the EU, the USA and Japan involved for added credibility. 
The new era which beckoned was one in which power would increasingly be exerted 
by economics - information networks, capital concentration, power in decision-making bodies, 
financial markets and the EU. Hence the wealth of resources of the peripheral areas is their 
only economic key to counteracting marginalisation. Tunander ( 1994: p.42) says that a similar 
attitude regarding their hinterlands exists in the Nordic capitals, as existed in Prague towards 
Slovakia, or the Lega Nord towards Southern Italy. Hence Norway's symbolic extension to 
the Kola Peninsula could be used as part of internal Nordpolitikk as well as a way of 
confronting the disintegration of Russia. Russia's neighbours have, therefore, been forced to 
devise new policies in order to cope with the economic chaos, crime, possible migration and 
environmental destruction spreading from the corresponding regions across the border. 
Meanwhile, international stability is being enhanced by allowing greater regular political and 
societal interaction both within the region, and outside it (ibid.). 
Already firmly rooted in local-level decision-making, the older Nordic North Calotte 
border region co-operation was used as the point of departure in the BEAR. Distinct 
challenges would, therefore, have to be met in the scheme's early stages, for not only were 
long-closed borders to be re-opened, but decision-making powers would also be at least 
partially transferred from metropolitan governments to the far North of their countries, as well 
as (potentially) to Brussels. New northern policies would, thus, have to be forged within the 
respective capitals, while regional officials began operating on a new level, transnationally. 
Viewed in this light, the activities of the Regional Council appear almost as a 
decentralised foreign policy, where local level politics influence national foreign policy issues. 
In Norway's opinion, such delegation has ensured the need for close co-operation between 
central and local authorities in all four countries, and seems to have vindicated not having 
subordinated the Regional Council to the Barents Council. Levels of openness and trust have 
to be developed 'horizontally', in terms of the number of specialised agencies in various issue 
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areas involved in the collaboration, as well as 'vertically', in terms of the political levels 
activated (Schram Stokke, 1994c: p.12). But, in the author's opinion, open channels of 
·' 
communication should enhance, rather than threaten, national policies. 
On the other hand, Russia's relations between centre and periphery highlight the 
potential conflicts of interest. Stoltenberg's successor as Norwegian Foreign Minister, Johan 
Holst quickly recognised the duality inherent in the BEAR structure, as well as the fact that 
lines of communication were being established beyond Moscow's control. He remarked soon 
after the declaration how incredible it was that "three small Northern countries propose to 
achieve a balanced and negotiated relationship through equal consultation with an impoverished 
giant" (Bathurst, 1994: p. 45). 
What was not foreseen at the time, however, was just how much relations within 
Norden would run independently, as Fenno-Scandia looked towards Brussels and the Baltic as 
soon as the Kirkenes Declaration had been signed, and no sooner had they nominally tamed the 
Russian bear. 
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5.1 Aspects of change: inter-Nordic relations 
Norway's main desire to establish the Barents Region has already been examined, as 
the internal influence of the southern metropoles upon the northern hinterlands continued as it 
always had in each of the Scandic countries. Only in Norway, however, could the North in 
tum exert much influence on policy-making in the capital. This difference in the reassessment 
of security priorities signalled, also, a wider change in the assessed need for inter-Nordic co-
operation. For while Oslo, Stockholm and Helsinki were enthusiastically agreeing on an 
economic/environmental strategy for their northern periphery, inter-Nordic relations on a wider 
scale were cooling now that the common Soviet threat had receded. 
Sweden appeared to be refocussing her attention away from Russia, as she looked to 
the international scene (eg. the UN) in order to raise her profile. Furthermore, in July 1991, 
she submitted her application to join the European Community Io, where, previously, the 
Socialists' neutrality policy had prevented Sweden from joining (Swedish Institute, 1995: p.1). 
This volte-face, coupled with Sweden's proposals for maritime regulation, began to arouse 
Norwegian suspicions - especially since Sweden had no coastline in the North, and appeared to 
be pushing strongly for something from which she could neither obviously lose nor benefit 
(Scrivener, 1996, pers. comm.). 
Finland, meanwhile, had played the part of intermediary after the 1987 Murmansk 
Speech - but, by 1991, no such role was needed. Conscious of the need to adapt, the Finns 
had launched the Rovaniemi environmental initiative, renegotiated the 'Friendship & Mutual 
Assistance Treaty' with Moscow, and, in January 1992, also announced their desire to seek 
EC membership. Again, the possibility that Finland might be seeking access to the Barents 
Sea, for fish, increased Norway's distrust of Finish motives (ibid.). 
In the author's opinion, Norway's competition with Finland to assume the leadership in 
Arctic affairs invigorated plans for the Barents co-operation. Anxious also to exert further 
influence after the BEAR was agreed, Norway subsequently pushed for the Stavanger 
Declaration in the Baltic Sea Region (modelled on that of the Barents Regional Council). 
Above all, Norway wanted to avoid peripheralisation should the EU membership plebiscite 
prove negative. The BEAR would thus give her international East-West prestige, while the 
country decided how relations were developing in the wider North-South context. 
10 Negotiations were undertaken by the non-socialist coalition government between 1991 and 1994, before a 
referendum in November 1994 saw 52.3% of the population vote in favour of membership. As with Finland, 
Sweden then acceded to the EU in January 1995. 
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5.2 Aspects of change: inter-Russian relations 
The Kola Peninsula is not just militarily important to Russia. The ports of Murmansk 
and Kandalaksha are gates to the West made all the more important by the loss of Baltic ports 
further South, while cross-border relations with neighbouring states have not yet been properly 
established. Moreover, Kola is rich in nickel, phosphate, rare metals, mica, oil and gas, as 
well as timber, fish and hydro-electricity. It is also an area free of the central planning dictates 
of the Soviet era (Luzin, 1994: p.74). Moscow, notwithstanding the NW's natural resources 
potential, scientific and industrial bases, its expertise in metallurgy, mining, nuclear power, 
ship-building, timber industries and fish processing, has allowed the oblasti limited 
autonomous rights, and accepted proposals for joint resources exploitation, provided there are 
clear national foreign policy, security, ecological and the social benefits, as well as local 
advantages (ibid.: p.76). Both local and national leaders, therefore, agreed to treat the Barents 
scheme in an organised, westernised way, and the Karelian authorities were belatedly granted 
accession to the BEAR, in order to similarly increase their trading, their standing, and revenues. 
Karelia had been seized from Finland by Stalin in 1939. Naturally enough, the collapse 
of the USSR brought growing demands, from exiles, for the restitution of their seized lands 
(The Guardian, 18 November 1993) 11 • Many people (even in government circles) in Finland, 
§u!Q«.tli'OIA 
therefore, were keen to see Karelia accede to the Kirkenes Treaty, in the hope that co-operation 
would, in a sense, help to bind lost territories back to the motherland (Kakonen, 1996, pers. 
comm.). Moscow's initial post-Communist policy had been to reverse Stalinist centralisation, 
thereby allowing republics like Karelia greater autonomy whilst simultaneously binding them to 
safe supervisors, at a time when the transition to capitalist democracy still seemed assured. 
Aware of her economic and political importance to Moscow, Karelia was, therefore, able to 
negotiate a 90% retention of tax revenues; she also assumed the right to grant trade licences, 
and the right to register foreign enterprises, which are both of crucial importance when 
establishing greater cross-border trading links (Rikkonen & Mannisto, 1993: p.170). 
The wider priorities in infrastructural development in the BEAR included new airline 
and postal services from Murmansk to Troms¢ and Kirkenes, where former East-West links 
11 In Helsinki, over 1992-3, both the Karelia Association and the Finnish Defence Review recommended the 
return of this land to Finns. Although it ha<; since been stressed a<; unrealistic, and is played down, the issue ha<; 
become sensitive in official circles on both sides of the border (Nyberg, 1996, pers. comm.). Russia has, in 
tum, been known to bar foreign tourists from the most sensitive areas, to avoid undue embarrassment, since 
Karelia's current day political standing is amongst the top tier of Russian constituent republics. 
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were minimal. Transport and communications will play an important part in the region's 
development, in laterally expanding North-South corridors as well as planning for use of the 
Northern Sea Routel2 (Holst, 1993: p.16) (see Map 7). The NSR has, therefore, as a result 
of its importance, been adopted as one of the issue areas to be dealt with within the co-
operative structure of the Barents Region, even though the scheme is not supposed to extend to 
maritime issues. 
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Map 7: Today's primary road, rail, shipping and air routes in the Barents Region (cf. Map 9) 
(Barentssekretariatet, 1994: pp.2.-3) 
• Naryan-Mar 
12 The Northern Sea Route (NSR), or North East Passage, is predicted to be one of the world's busiest future 
waterways, since ice-breaking technology and global temperature increases have made the Arctic Ocean rim more 
navigable, and journey times, eg. between Western Europe and Japan, can be halved in comparison to 
conventional routes. As the largest port in the Arctic, and as the current base for the Russian Arctic fleet, 
Murmansk should benefit greatly from any such development. The world's largest shipyard is also located in 
the Barents Region, being that at Severodinsk, in Archangelsk. Previously, during the Cold War, few Western-
owned ships would have called in to either port, because NA TO opposed their stopping in or near the Kola 
Peninsula if they'wJshed to also dock in Northern Norway (Kosmo, 1996a) 
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Greater interest and investment in the Barents scheme, however, are still much needed, 
as the BEAR continues to operate at its best on paper. The economic and political motives for 
·' 
inter-regional co-operation were always going to be easier to understand than gaining broader 
public support would be (Tunander, 1994: p.36), added to which, Yeltsin' s support for 
regional autonomy within Russia ties in curiously with periods of elections. Forging a new 
identity for the neonate politico-economic entity therefore plays an important part m 
expounding the benefits of the development of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region. 
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5.3 Forging the BEAR 
Region-building is a purposeful activity, and one which builds upon historical and 
tffe\~lo.lt~d_ 1· · D . h d f . . b·1· . b d 1· k h menta reg1ona 1zatlon. esp1te t e egree o mev1ta 1 1ty m cross- or er m s across t e 
former Iron Curtain, the Barents scheme was, without doubt, one imposed 'top down' by 
national governments upon the region. The government in Norway was therefore keen to 
make co-operation in the Barents Region appear a natural, age-old process merely interrupted 
only by Communism, if it was to gain acceptance for the BEAR amongst the local population. 
Many people in the Nordic part of the Barents Region may not feel that they have much in 
common with their Russian counterparts, or vice versa. In order that this could could change, 
"like nation-building, region-building selects and dramatises historical myths instrumental to 
the project in question" (Tunander, 1994.: p.37). Thus reference was made to the Viking Age, 
as well as the Pomar trade, to reinstate the importance of the old ties and commercial networks. 
Although the indigenous Saami span the old divide, and constitute an important element 
of cultural homogeneity, they have not deliberately been involved in region-building. For 
everyone, decades of secularisation may have removed many otherwise inherent East-West 
differences (eg. religion, despite a religious revival in Russia), but the Russian political system 
has been shifting constantly westwards in style since Gorbachev came to power, and the 
BEAR consequently fulfils more than the minimal social and cultural prerequisites for 
recognition as a defined regional entity. 
To reassure the inhabitants of the area that the BEAR was the natural path to follow, the 
Norwegian government has defined the BEAR as the 'normalisation' of relations, as though it 
was restoring them to what they would have been between Scandinavia and Russia, were it not 
for the Revolution of 1917. Ministers and politicians on both sides of the former divide thus 
drew attention to the most obvious link of old, the Pomar trade, since, as Schram Stokke and 
Tunander have commented (1994: p.230), such a "radically new policy has to be presented 
both as something very new - to focus attention and resources away from traditional policy -
but also as something very traditional, reinterpreting the new policy as a return to normality. 
Region building in that sense is a parallel to 19th century nation-building, with its selective use 
of historical affinity". Indeed, historians like Jens Petter Nielsen eagerly played their part in 
reviving interest in the region's common heritage, and often with government backing. With 
the source of 'real' Norwegian identity to be found in the mountains, fjords and peasant 
settlements of the North, where fishing is the traditional livelihood, the Viking 
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'Bjanneland'/Barents Region context also gave the BEAR a symbolism which elevated it 
almost beyond criticism. On the other hand, there is clearly also something to be said for a 
natural evolution of co-operation. 
However, popular support in the North for renewed trading contacts to the East was 
not quite what Oslo had in mind, when, ironically, it coincided with opposition to the EU. The 
BEAR had been planned to link Russo-Norwegian co-operation into Norwegian integration in 
the EU (which is to say that the more far-reaching co-operation in Arctic Europe presupposed a 
Norway already firmly connected to Western institutions) (Tunander, 1994: p.40). The 
importance of Europe would be reflected in the importance of the BEAR. The Region would 
also demonstrate practically the principles of subsidiarity 13 , to show EU practices in a better 
light in Northern Norway (as, for example, European financial aid would be provided in the 
quest to solve environmental and nuclear waste problems in the Russian Arctic). 
As the Russian Foreign Minister was fully aware (Kozyrev, 1993: p.25), the 'Europe 
of Regions' philosophy is becoming an important method of handling the continent's affairs 
and enhancing stability, permitting some local or regional decision-making whilst maintaining 
adequate state structures and furthering cross-border relations. In its renunciation of Soviet 
ideology after 1991, Russia eagerly embraced such thinking, and agreed to co-operate with 
Norway in order that this might be done, rushing from insularity and reactionism to provide a 
unique opportunity for co-operation. 
Hence the BEAR came into being in 1993, widely accepted by the Northern population. 
Although the Alaskan Governor commented in Troms¢, "the greatest challenge of those who 
live in the Arctic is to cope with decisions made in the South that don't work ... [and which are] 
born of. .. ignorance" (Hickel, 1993: p.12), and the following year he still maintained that 
neither Moscow nor Oslo understood the Arctic (Hickel, 1994: p.2), it has now become clear 
that the BEAR has had an important effect on Arctic Europe. There certainly has been 
considerable change in policy-making for the North, as the following chapters will 
demonstrate. But at the same time, there are important aspects of continuity. Both of these 
will now be considered. 
13 Subsidiarity was conveniently translated into 'prox,imity' in the Nordic languages, in order to emphasize 
decision-making at the lowest possible level (ie. precisely what many sceptics feared would not happen) 
(Airoldi, 1995: p.3-7). 
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6.0 The operation of the BEAR 
6.1 Political Security 
The successful operation of the Barents Region project at the regional level may depend 
above all upon economic profitability, but in international terms, it is the political gain for 
which states are playing. Moscow's interest in giving impetus to NW Russia through opening 
up to the West corresponds to the Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish interest in giving their 
own northern counties an economic stimulus by downplaying state barriers. On the other hand, 
given the current uncertainty in Russia and the Nordic countries (if not the West as a whole) 
over the fate of democratic government after the Russian presidential elections in June 1996 
(see Fig. 2), political security remains a key component in the Norwegian strategy inherent in 
the formation of the Barents Region. 
The concept of the BEAR being a Western one, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei 
Kozyrev, who backed it, was clearly orientated towards Western progressivism. Zhirinovsky, 
however, with his oppositional ideologies, would almost certainly reject the Barents Initiative, 
or at least quite fundamentally alter it. Kozyrev alerted the West to such probabilities in his 
Stockholm speech in December 1992, warning that a reactionary, imperialistic and thereby anti-
Western, resentful Russia, could only be averted through greater Western support for Russia's 
reforms. "The message was clear: if the West wishes to negotiate with a progressive Russia, 
then it must vigorously support such institutions as the Barents Initiative" (Bathurst, 1994: p. 
45). 
In NW Russia, as, indeed, across the former Soviet Union, the danger that unfulfilled 
economic and social expectations have created a climate of disappointment and disillusionment 
has given added responsibility not only to Russian politicians to yield results, but al~o to their 
Western partners ( Godal, 1995b ). Yet there has been a simultaneous loss of momentum and 
enthusiasm in Barents region-building, political enthusiasm and investment, especially from 
Finland and Sweden, the junior partners, which flies in the face of political logic for an area so 
long their Achilles heel. These countries' partial neglect of their responsibilities in promoting 
the region has meant that the drive for the continued operation of the Barents initiative has been 
left almost entirely in Norwegian hands. In this sense, Norway's role in the BEAR is as much 
'peace-building' as it is intern(ation)al Nordpolitikk. 
To date, the leaders of the NW regions of Russia have proved some of the staunchest 
supporters of Yeltsin and his politics, partly because of the opportunities granted to develop 
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their areas' own international contacts, to help compensate for the reduction of economic 
resources from Moscowl-1-. Although reform-orientated candidates represent these areas, a 
large protest vote in 1993 and 1995 reflected NW Russia's growing dissatisfaction with the 
decline in living standards and the spread of unemployment. The BEAR must, therefore, 
deliver results quickly, if extremist politics are to be averted. 
Figure 2: 
Boris Yeltsin 
campmgnmg 
for Russia's 
June 1996 
presidential 
elections, 
and surrounded 
by folk singers 
in Archangelsk 
(The Times, 
27May 1996) 
14 In the December 1993 elections, only -53% of electors, on average, voted in Karelia, Murmansk and 
Archangelsk, and _support for Zhirinovsky's Liberal-Democratic Party reached almost 20% (or 57% in the 
military base of Severomorsk). Baev ( 1994: pp.180-181) provides a more complete discussion. 
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The anti-Communists in Russia in the late 1980s had come forward as Westernisers, 
not as nationalists, as in the rest of Eastern Europe. They therefore failed to link the struggle 
for democratic rights and freedoms with the restoration of the Russia the Bolsheviks destroyed 
(The Guardian, 20 April 1996). It is for this reason, therefore, that today's democratic, market 
economy Russia is in jeopardy from political extremism - and with it, the successful economic 
functioning of the BEAR. For although the Communist Party leader, Zyuganov, promises to 
maintain the institutions of post-Communism, he also plans wealth redistribution, and would 
use protectionist methods to reduce imports and foreign business involvement. In foreign 
affairs, he would pursue a Russia-first policy, no longer worrying whether Russia's actions 
satisfy the West. 
Thus threatened with defeat, Yeltsin has already begun stealing the Communists' 
clothes, with a new emphasis on an independent foreign policy, internal spending priorities and 
confederation within old USSR boundaries. In this sense, even if Zyuganov loses this 
Summer's poll, the communists will have already won their argument, and "the Westernising 
policies of the last ten years, moderate under Gorbachev, but taken to politically destructive 
extremes by Yeltsin, have run their course and, from now on, the outside world will have to 
deal with a prouder and more awkward Russia" (ibid.). 
Two years ago, the BEAR was described as "a rare window of opportunity ... now 
opened for Norden ... But success depends upon moving quickly ... " (Bathurst, 1994: p.55). 
This was especially so in terms of developing and defending new institutions, and promoting 
sound investments, fiscal guarantees and legal codes of practice. Local government, 
international and domestic businesses were already making gains by then, and were being 
forced to take more independent and creative roles. They were backed up by Western support 
to assume greater initiative than perhaps Moscow would concede. Looking back in 1996, 
however, it seems that Moscow, and even the military, became peripheral to Murmansk's 
interests only during an interlude in Russian politics. 
As the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Holst, clearly understood, the NW of Russia 
could not operate independently of Moscow indefinitely. He might not have been able to 
foresee a return to many aspects of Communism, but, as Bathurst makes plain, "while in the 
present there must be a rapid development of the regional idea, in the long run, its viability will 
also depend on paying appropriate tribute to Moscow. A major politico-cultural problem will 
be to determine how and when that is to be done. In the meantime, as a new Pomor trade 
develops, ang ~efore Moscow [or its military] resumes its traditional control, Norden has 
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indeed the opportunity of creating the first model of a possible new world order." At present, 
Russia's chairmanship of the Barents Council is the only forum of European countries with a 
Russian presidency. It is therefore seen as important not only that Russia be accorded some 
prestige through this body, but that other states take careful note of what is happening in 
Russian political and military thought. 
For Russia, currently seeking to reassert her position as a major power, the BEAR is 
not a priority, although it is an important geopolitical asset, and Russian foreign policy likes to 
be able to take every advantage of it. It is also an interesting example of how regional co-
operation can help quell disputes between centre and periphery which threaten the very 
existence of the Russian Federation (Baev, 1994: p.175). For Norway, having another forum 
in which to observe the trends in Russian thinking and politics is central to that country's 
security planning. Norway would "be very unhappy" to see any independence movement in 
Russia jeopardising this situation, but then "the chances of this developing into a viable 
movement do not seem high enough to keep the decision-makers awake" (Gleditsch, 1996, 
pers. comm.). 
Although Scandinavians may sympathise with the ne,ed of Russian politicians to 
formulate and promote their national interests in such a context, nationalistic trends in Russian 
politics have created a more apprehensive air in the West, because no-one can foretell what will 
happen next. Yet, as a great power on the European continent, Russia must have a central role 
in the security architecture now being designed. Recognising this, Godal admits that, 
"although Russia does not constitute a threat to Norway, we cannot just ignore the fact that 
sizeable military forces are still stationed near our borders" (1995a). Security is not simply a 
regional matter, and, as a result, the BEAR makes no provisions to try to solve security 
problems alone. On the other hand, should there be a problem, it does provide a valuable 
forum in which to vent concerns - eg. over the Finnish border question, although, thus far, this 
issue has not been raised, and, officially, Finland has no desire to see the restitution of its old 
borders (considering Finnish Karelia as Germany does Kaliningrad) (Nyberg, 1996, pers. 
comm.). Although this subject is often discussed in the press, the strip of the Barents Sea 
which Finland also once possessed no longer fits into the equation (ibid.). 
For one thing, Finland cannot afford a dispute with Russia or Karelia. Not only does 
she rely increasingly on Karelia for timber, but, as Stoltenberg warned, closer co-operation 
means that the region will be more easily affected by developments in Russia, even if political 
events there should take an unexpected turn. The best way to deal with such a situation was 
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thus to ensure that the Nordic countries are firmly linked with broader-based European 
arrangements, by means of collective security (see Maps 4 and 5). Regional stability required 
El.J backing to match the Russian political heavyweight. Hence the deeper the regional co-
operation in the BEAR, the more necessary Fenno-Scandic membership of the EU was 
considered to be. 
However, Norway has never been blind to the possibility that the reconstruction and 
disorder inherent in Russian society may at any time disrupt support for the Barents scheme. 
The post-Soviet administration has already broken down, distributional networks have altered, 
and governance structures are far from settled. Anti-western sentiment is also far stronger now 
than it was at the time of the Kirkenes Declaration, and arguments for the stability of central 
planning oppose the currently chaotic and harsh market economy. Decentralisation in 
Scandinavia has had very different consequences to decentralization in the former USSR. For 
Norway, the BEAR encourages financial private-sector investment and cultural contact. For 
Moscow, with many of Russia's armed forces based in the NW, there are clearly different 
reasons for wanting regional co-operation: foremost amongst them was economic necessity. 
Norwegian foreign/Nordpolitikk therefore aimed to stabilise Russia, to mutual advantage, 
precisely through economic channels (Darst, 1996: p.100). 
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6.2 Economics 
Postwar European co-operation, as in any co-operative scheme, works best through 
mutual economic gain. Co-operation in the Barents Region is no exception, and promoting 
stability in the region is important across the West, since a quarter of the developed world's 
foreign debt is owed to Russia (The European, 2 May 96). Economically, the two sides of the 
former Iron Curtain are markedly different, in terms of unequal distribution of capital, and the 
extreme differences in cost structures, purchasing power, accessibility of goods, and in 
services and know-how. But it was also recognised early in the day that each of the member 
counties' economies are complementary, very open, and characterised by undiversified 
production structures, with a high dependence on externally produced goods and services. The 
economic connections between North and South are also far more significant than those across 
national boundaries (see Map 8). These factors, coupled with the disintegration of the Soviet 
empire and the current economic crisis in Russia (which has broken up many traditional 
economic relations with other parts of the Soviet Union), make regional economic planning a 
necessity. For Russia, therefore, East-West economic reorientation was not just cosmetic - it 
was vital (Castberg, 1994: p.102). 
A regional economic policy implies either the regional aspect of the State's national 
policy, or the social and economic policy of the local authorities in relation to regions within 
their jurisdiction (Luzin, 1993: p.125). The Kirkenes Declaration called for both of these, in a 
series of concrete economic measures for the post-Soviet European Arctic, including joint oil 
and gas exploration; the protection and restoration of the environment; the conversion of 
defence industries to peaceful uses, eg. telecommunications and shipbuilding; the creation of 
favourable conditions for further joint ventures; and solutions to the economic and cultural 
problems of the indigenous peoples. The BEAR would not simply be merging separate 
national economies, but integrating regions within nations into one new, wider region. 
There is great potential for the BEAR, in terms of resource exploitation and processing 
(see Map 9), international transport links, tourism, low labour costs (which may also attract 
investment in Kola), and Russia's reasonably large local markets and need for improved 
infrastructure (Kazantseva & Westin, 1994: pp.109-110)15 . Russian media often used to 
l5 Karelia's most valuable asset is timber, and Finnish loggers moved in almost as soon as the Iron Curtain 
collapsed (today performing -15% of operations). In return for the right to fell trees, therefore - even in reserves 
- the Finns build i:,oads, erect power lines and improve the infrastructure, making dubious arrangements with 
insolvent authorities (Moscow News, 28 March 1996). 
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argue that co-operation projects merely aim to substitute Western for Russian technology, and 
thus undermine Russia's status and economic potential, transforming her into an economically 
retarded supplier of raw materials (Schram Stokke, 1994c: p.29). But the successful 
exploitation of oil and natural gas, hard minerals and fish stocks, have simultaneously placed a 
higher value on Arctic areas in recent years, thereby increasing the very chances for co-
operation (Archer, 1988: p.139). 
Map 8: Road connections between the North Calotte and the Kola Peninsula 
(Kazantseva and Westin, 1994: pp. 120-1) 
Whereas NW Russia's population is heavily urbanised and industrialised, like Northern 
Scandinavia, it remains import dependent. In contrast, the Great Calotte is sparsely populated, 
with predominantly primary industries. Between them, there has already been some significant 
cross-regional business and investment from West to East, making use of the low-paid but 
well-trained Russian workforce. Detailed planning is now underway to exploit future Russian 
market opportunities. 
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The fishing sector is a little different, having already operated under Soviet jurisdiction, 
and with institutions of its own already in operation. Although fishing was not, therefore, 
among the seven issue-areas listed in the Kirkenes Declaration, there has been further 
integration in this sphere, since fishing remains the economic mainstay of the Barents Region 
(Hoel, 1994: p.121). Nevertheless, there is a risk of a dawning conflict of interest, as the 
modernization of processing plants in Russia puts them in direct competition with plants in the 
West (Chaturvedi, 1996a: p.186). The Barents Sea dispute may also continue between the two 
littoral states, despite the BEAR co-operation (although the strategic value of the area, and the 
loss of prestige, in ceding to Norway anything claimed by Russia, probably account for this). 
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Map 9: The natural resources of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region 
(Barentssekretariatet, 1994: p.6) 
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When the BEAR was established, Norwegian government ministers at least considered 
it ~n opportunity to address the maritime boundary problem once again, as potential petroleum 
exploitation would also require recognised delimitation. But, in order for this to occur, Russia 
needs to perceive that the changes inherent in the end of the Cold War are compelling enough to 
alter earlier policy (ibid.: p.193). The need for a permanent settlement has therefore hitherto 
been avoided, whilst fishing regulations remain acceptable to both sides, and large catches 
continue to be made. As with the BEAR as a whole, Russia and Norway tried to devise a 
system which would suit their needs very comfortably: both countries can therefore regulate 
who fishes in the Barents Sea (whereas EU membership would have meant openly sharing 
Norwegian waters beyond twelve nautical miles from the coast, and having quotas open to 
exploitation). Currently, some two thirds of Norwegian fish exports go to the EU (Hoel, 
1994: p.123), since Norway's accession to the EEA (with the other EFf A countries) in 
January 1994 opened access to EU markets without having to abide by the aquis 
communautaire of fishery policy regulations. 
In terms of the economy as a whole, it has often been said, that the BEAR represents 
the "normalisation of relations between the neighbouring nations on the top of Europe", as the 
effective barriers to trade and integration have been cast aside, and the outpost towns of 
Kirkenes and Nikel have been reorientated to be at the heart of a new region (Castberg, 1994: 
p.101 ). Norway may be operating the stick and carrot principle with Russia, but if Russia 
does help the West to help itself, she will eventually see concrete gains, as with the current 
infrastructural improvements in terms of sewerage and water supply in Murmansk. 
In one sense, however, there seems to be a strange logic in regional devolution, since it 
is a strong central government, and, through it, attempts to reinforce the economy, which bring 
business investment, and hence benefit the ordinary citizen. Yet so far, in the BEAR, the 
opposite has been the case, and the regional economy has had to develop through Norwegian 
and EU aid schemes. Measuring the economic success of the Barents Region in this light is 
not easy, and the initial optimism on all sides has been somewhat set back. Even the official 
Norwegian line on the subject has been to take account of the realities of the situation. 
There is, however, broader public involvement now than there was, and industrialists' 
groups are discussing their respective problems together (Godal, 1995b). But there is no 
quantifiable statistical evidence for economic progress because of the BEAR, to reinforce the 
argument for its success. The Foreign Minister could offer only the following explanations: "it 
is no easy task to normalise our relations and establish practical co-operation with Russia. 
41 
Much remains to be done [there] before conditions for private foreign investment reach a 
satisfactory level. There are major deficiencies in the legal system ... law enforcement and 
,, 
business legislation." The result has not only been Norwegian exasperation, and an apparent 
wonder that Norway became so closely tied up with such a system in the first place, but the 
continued backwardness of the Russian economy and lack of improvement in living standards, 
both reflected in the relative instability of the political situation - which, in turn, further 
influences the level of foreign investment (ibid.). Similarly, it is "unrealistic at this stage to 
believe that substantially better conditions can be established for economic co-operation in the 
Barents Region than for co-operation with Russia in general" (ie. not much). As it stands, the 
BEAR therefore appears as little more than a "workshop" for East-West development (ibid.). 
And yet the Barents scheme structure does work. Indeed, the Barents Council's very 
functioning is of considerable political importance, overcoming prejudices, promoting 
neighbourliness and strengthening stability. A solid front thereby attracts external interest - eg. 
Japanese interest in the Northern Sea Route, or Portugal's interest in fish stocks (Kozyrev, 
1994: p.28) - for co-operation and integration have obvious benefits. Nonetheless, so too do 
free-riding and protectionism (Heininen et al., 1995: p.51). In the context of wider long-term 
security, however, economic changes which are met by demands for increased protection were 
to be offset by maximising the benefits of interdependence, at minimal cost. The fisheries 
authorities in Norway remain rather sceptical of regionalization, for fear that the resource base 
may come to be seen as a shared regional, rather than national, asset, as regional boards try to 
gain influence in stock management (Hoel, 1994: p.128). For the majority of regional 
businesses, however, the economics of the BEAR make real sense in the wake of the Cold 
War. 
In Soviet days, the defence industry had consumed -60% of industrial production in 
Murmansk. In contrast, Russia allocated only 16% of its budget to defence in 1992 (since 
reduced), and keeping both the military and workers content has thus been a priority in both 
regions as government spending and subventions have fallen (Jonson, 1994: p.170). Even so, 
in practice, business can only take place with the military's consent. As long as international 
security issues are assigned top priority in the Russian Northwest, economic collaboration will 
be permitted only where it does not conflict with the demands of the armed forces. Economics 
do not, as yet, exert an influence on military priorities. 
Previously, in the Barents Region, the military was a major employer on both sides of 
the Iron Curtain. All communications were with the economic and political capitals further 
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South (see Map 10), and primary industries served manufacturing plants' needs elsewhere, 
raJher than being developed locally for potential markets in the far North. There was, as a 
result, a high economic price being paid for the Cold War, as well as a social one. But there 
was another price to pay for its demise. 
Map 10: The Nordic airline flight system in 1990 
(Kazantseva & Wes tin, 1994: p. 117) 
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Transportation and telecommunications, above all, require investment, for Russian 
localities that can be tied to the Nordic countries by new, direct communications routes are 
likely to have substantially better prospects than those without (Wiberg, 1994: p.36) . 
. 
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Consequently, Norway early on extended its telephone cable system, to include Murmansk 
under the same area code. One of the key points in the transition, however, is to encourage 
local business venture investment. To date, such success is hard to gauge. Even in capitalist 
Norway, most extraction/processing companies are owned by Southern/foreign interests, with 
external management, even in trawler operations (Aanesen, 1993: p.67). 
The Norwegian public sector's main concern heretofore in NW Russia has been the 
extraction, and, to a lesser degree, processing, industries (which were often the most lucrative, 
but also the most polluting). Due to the considerable costs of effluent reduction, even the fate 
of the flagship Nike} project remains undecided. Nevertheless, regional co-operation has 
generated a variety of projects without a major drain on financial resources, some (such as 
assistance in improving the standards of drinking water) with very useful and tangible benefits. 
The Barents Council's work remains in its early stages, although the respective Foreign 
Ministers, meeting in October 1995, agreed to recommend a programme of fifteen further 
infrastructure projects (including the modernisation of Kandalaksha aluminium works and 
Pechenga nickel works, and improved road and rail communications, harbours and airports), 
provided that international funding can be found (The Financial Times, 20 November 1995). 
Economic disparity in itself provides further good reason for investment in the BEAR, 
in order to dissuade Russians from crime, from smuggling (especially drugs and alcohol) and 
from prostitution. Should the established order fall apart in Russia, then there could,;be very 
direct consequences for the Nordic countries, because of their geographical proximity, and, 
therefore, stabilisation forms the most effective means of Scandinavian defence (Wiberg, 1994: 
p.27). 
Karelia, in particular, offers the West large potential, providing low-cost materials, 
manufacture and labour, at least in the short-term. The Russian sector of the region also offers 
the penetration of wider markets, and the ports of Murmansk and St. Petersburg are already 
working to overcapacity (Rikkonen & Mannisto, 1993: p.175). Eventually, new markets and 
new resources are hoped to stimulate markets on both sides of the former East-West divides. 
Yet, on a wider scale, perhaps the most important area in which regional economic gain will be 
apparent, is through the extraction of oil and gas. Norway, above all, will thereby benefit. 
Norway's economy is currently the world's eighth largest, a position attained as 
Europe's biggest producer of natural gas, and the world's second largest producer of oill6. 
16 Norway's economic importance, if defined by G-7 (Group of Seven) criteria, would place the country in the 
position of G-8 (immediately after Britain and Canada). 
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High quality gold may also soon be boosting the wealth generated within the country (The 
European, 2 May 1996). Furthermore, Norway's oil reserves have enabled her to maintain 
influence in Europe, whilst paying nothing to Brussels to pursue a policy of effective shadow 
membership of the European Union. Bjizjrn Tore Godal, Norway's Foreign Minister, believes 
any foreign policy disadvantages of not belonging to the EU are mitigated by Norway's 
membership of NATO. The automatic right to prosperity and economic credibility may 
disappear from the beginning of next century, as oil production declines, but with Norway's 
newly-established Petroleum Fund there to invest oil profits for the future, Oslo's policy seems 
to be to stabilise Norway's influence in the northern region, and to let the rest of Europe take 
care of itself. 
Recently, Russian and international oil companies have discovered vast reserves of oil 
and gas, both on and off the Barents coastline. A large part of it is hidden under the Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug 17, where the 6,500 Nenets are politically dwarfed by 40,000 Russians and 
Komi. The latter's wish for the eventual economic exploitation of the area appears unstoppable 
now that latest estimates predict 1.2 billion tonnes of oil in the Sokmanovskoye field, 489 
billion cubic metres of gas, and 20 billion tonnes of oil condensate in the district (Ludviksen, 
1995; pp.63-64). 
Russia has already joined the international oil market, which has made fuel prices 
rocket in price (ibid.). Freight costs have consequently risen, and the populations of the Far 
North are affected further by the absence of roads: all transport of people is by air. Reindeer 
farmers, however high their yields, are left to find a way of transporting their meat to market, 
and then to sell it at whatever prices are negotiated by the combines. With slaughtering always 
occurring in November, the annual pay packet is almost worthless by February, due to rampant 
inflation. Hence little economic optimism remains for herding. Oil and gas are more lucrative, 
and fit the megaproject criteria envisaged by the BEAR's founding fathers. They may even 
provide many local jobs in the construction stages - but in an area of empty state coffers, any 
benefits are not guaranteed to be permanent, nor to be spread where they are most needed, 
even when negotiations take place in the Nenets capital (Naryan Mar), rather than in distant 
Archangelsk (ibid.). There thus remains scant regard even for okrug-wide Nordpolitikk in 
such circumstances, as the authorities of the Russian North continue to seize the initiative for 
themselves wherever they can. More importantly, it would appear, as a rule, that economic 
17 The Nenets Autonomous Okrug forms part of Archangelsk Oblast, although it is self-governed and has its 
own capital al Naryan Mar (see Map 3). Nenet people actually form a minority, but their reindeer herding 
activities currently generate the region's most important source of income. 
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development may now be what drives Barents Region co-operation, rather than the other way 
round. 
Clearly, investment and development remain incomplete in the BEAR at this stage, as 
national and local governments await private initiatives to match their own enthusiasm for the 
region's economic potential. Businesses remain reluctant to become too heavily involved in the 
Russian sector, generally, however, unless they can be sure of quick returns. But the Russian 
transition to a market economy is slow to progress, and purchasing power remains limited. 
Only in the Russian defence industry, it would seem, can spending levels be assured. Hence it 
is this very military priority which is again concerning the West. 
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6.3 Military Security 
"The security of the Arctic is as much affected by circumstances, traditions and other 
factors specific to the circumpolar North, as it is to the fundamental changes occurring in 
international relations" (Mottola, 1996, p.2). In the West, therefore, the fact that Russia is in a 
maelstrom of internal political wrangling and power-seeking means that military security policy 
has not lost its importance. For although the Nordic states face a post-Cold War Russia, they 
remain aware that the end of open conflict has not reduced their need for security. One of the 
reasons for this, is that the Kola Peninsula seems destined to remain heavily militarised - not 
simply for the sake of tradition, or because of Russian military-political trends, but because 
pressure from Kazakhstan has driven Russia's nuclear testing programme back to Novaya 
Zemlya, while developments in the Pacific region could easily result in Russia's entire strategic 
nuclear fleet being redeployed in the Arctic (Gizewski, 1993: p.10). The region already 
contains Russia's chief naval port. Policy dictates, not surprisingly, come as often from the 
military as from civilian government. 
Integration in the military sense in the BEAR is really not a subject which has been 
broached, for ignoring military concerns gave the Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, 
much greater scope in the Kirkenes Declaration. Even though the BEAR challenges military 
leaders' overall authority in the Kola area, many leaders have, through necessity, been 
supportive, since budgetary cutbacks have made the military more dependent on local civilian 
authorities. Consequently, it is imperative not only that central governments remain in overall 
control of northern policies, but also that the wider Cold War era defence alliances be suitably 
adjusted and maintained while a new 'security architecture' is devised for the whole Arctic 
region (Asgrimson, 1995b). Canada has urged Northern Europe to take the initiative, advising 
that the "current climate of amity be used to put confidence- and security-building measures in 
place in the Arctic, as a hedge against any future decline in political relations, or the growth of 
instability in Russia" (Lamb, 1994: p.10). 
But the possession of nuclear weapons still guarantees Russia great power status, and 
Russia's smaller neighbours continue to pursue independent strategic planning policies as a 
result. Sweden may therefore be downgrading her military presence in the North, but 
Finland's military capacity there is being increased. Finland, it would appear, does not believe 
in trusting other nations when dealing with Russia, and so plays a very close hand, and 
considerably detached from Sweden. Sweden has been very cynical of real progress, and so 
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prefers the role of interpreter and peacemaker to one of any action. Norway, meanwhile, has 
continued her tripartite foreign policy, simultaneously reaching out to the US and NATO, to 
Russia, and across Scandinavia. Finland interprets this as the result of internal confusion 
(livonen, 1996, pers. comm.), but, having actually devised the BEAR, Norway expects due 
Nordic influence. Her partners in the region (especially Russia) consequently play that for 
what they can get. Norway may, therefore, be very rational, within her own culture, in her 
approach towards the BEAR, but simultaneously, the Norwegians' romanticism for the North 
may blind their vision as to the ultimate prospects of integration, when so little has changed 
since the end of the Cold War in terms of national military security goals (Bathurst, 1996, pers. 
comm.; Kakonen, 1996, pers. comm.). The real prospects for multidimensional collaboration 
are, consequently, rather slim. The Barents co-operation, in this light, is little more than a 
porous plaster to cover the wound. 
Overall, however, security today is seen in much broader terms than hitherto. Strategic 
nuclear stability and arms control remain important issues, but the dismantlement of nuclear 
weapons mostly threatens ecological security. Cold War naval competition is mitigated by the 
political atmosphere, whereas naval arms control has never been on the Barents agenda, and 
the BEAR has no competence for dispute settlement or conflict management (Mottola, 1996: 
p.8). Stoltenberg was well aware that the regional/local approach to military and sovereignty 
problems would be more likely to break the stalemate situations of the past, but Olsson & 
Sakharov (1994: pp.144-6) believe that, "notwithstanding the fundamental changes in the 
global political climate that have occurred ... no really profound shifts in international security 
policy can yet be observed." The potential of a common European defence system, and the 
recent declaration that the WEU 18 become a 'component' of the EU, has alarmed politicians in 
Norway and Russia,just as Western actions prompted Russian responses during the Cold War 
(The Daily Telegraph, 8 May 1996): Russia fears isolation, while Norway fears further 
European marginalisation (Asgrimson, 1995c: p.2). 
Traditionally, of course, Norway has always looked westwards, towards NATO, for 
her defence, and Finland to the Soviet Union, while Sweden's neutrality balanced the Nordic 
course as a buffer zone between this Scylla and Charybdis (Tunander, 1989: p.11). Extending 
l8 The Western European Union (WEU) was established in 1955 as a consultative forum for European military 
issues. It ha'> always had close links with the US-dominated North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and 
today is co-ordinated through NA TO as well as western European governments. Should the EU ever adopt a 
common security .and foreign policy, it is likely that the WEU will act as its military flank, even though 
membership of the two bodies is by no means exclusive. 
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one side's activity would lead automatically to a counterpoising response. Consultation in 
security matters between the Nordic countries thus always occurred, but it was never 
extensive, and the end of the Cold War presaged many changes. Since it is important that 
Russia is not made to feel threatened by any enlargement of the NA TO Alliance in the wake of 
the Cold War, the Organisation places great emphasis on security co-operation with Moscow. 
Nevertheless, Norway has to be careful in taking the lead in this field, for fear of strengthening 
local control in NW Russia relative to Moscow, or civilian control relative to the military. 
Security policy and competitive maritime strategies understandably underlay Norway's 
initiative for the Barents Region. Whereas under conditions of Cold War rivalry, global 
security requirements took predecence over the local aspirations, the attenuation of global 
rivalry opened the way to a reappraisal of regional security arrangements (Gizewski, 1993: 
p.4). The current political context thus enables regional powers to make a more vigorous 
contribution to their own security, as well as to take a greater role in the definition of what 
those security arrangements are. 
A new security paradigm is thus now being created through the BEAR, to overcome 
"both the residual Cold War confrontation and the current economic and ethno-nationalist 
division of Europe" (Baev, 1994: p.183). Stability in the Baltic is a prerequisite for security in 
the Barents region (Kosmo, 1996b), while another main goal of regional and multilateral co-
operation in Arctic Europe has been to decrease tension in the Northern Seas. Svalbard has 
always been demilitarised (in accordance with the Spitsbergen Treaty), although the 
geostrategic value of the Barents Sea remains high. It is because of this that the Barents Sea 
boundary question remains suspended, as traditional notions of security continue to impose 
serious restraints on co-operation and conflict resolution. Grasping their opportunity, 
therefore, further South, Sweden and Finland have, since 1991, become observers of the 
WEU, and associate members of NATO through the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (see 
Map 5). 
NA TO' s answer to the new world order was to begin a process of enlargement through 
gradual co-operation, starting with the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative. The cornerstones 
of their security structures clearly weakened, and the very meaning of neutrality questioned by 
the end of the Cold War, Finland and Sweden belong to this, even though the proposals were 
not designed with an Arctic perspective (Heininen, Jalonen & Kakonen, 1995: p.79). Joint 
Nordic military exercises will link in, beginning in Ofoten (Norway) in 1997 (Kosmo, 1996a), 
and although B,.ussia strongly opposes its immediate neighbours working within NA TO, 
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Finland and Sweden are treated differently because they have each agreed to limit their activities 
to clearly defined areas. Moreover, today's Finnish doctrine stresses that she remains 
independent and non-aligned (livonen, 1996, pers. comm.). On the other hand, relations 
between Russia and Finland, and Russia and NATO may yet change, and negatively affect 
intra-regional development (Kakonen, 1996, pers. comm.). 
Partnership for Peace also proposed a series of joint military manoeuvres which have 
given the Russian forces in the Barents region a chance to work alongside the traditional 
enemy. The Nordic states are unwilling to organise bilateral military activities with Russia, 
particularly in an area for civil co-operation, although they are willing to organise multi-polar 
PfP manoeuvres (livonen, 1996, pers. comm.). The BEAR thus has an implicit military 
dimension, with perspectives for development, and "more committed Western participation in 
solving the painful social problems of the Russian Navy could become a real catalyst for co-
operation in other fields" (Baev, 1994: p. l 78). Rather ironically, considering the apparent lack 
of enthusiasm of late for the BEAR, the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs still proclaims 
that "security policy must be viewed as a form of influence. Seeking security means seeking 
ways of exerting influence" (Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1995: p.66). 
It is, therefore, clear that Gorbachev, in 1987, may have split military issues from 
civilian. But the result in the BEAR has been to create a region in a state of persistent dualism 
(Nilsen, 1994: p.29). Since many of today's most vivid threats are not military, however, and 
pay no respect to national frontiers, economic and environmental challenges increase the 
interdependence between states and thereby require their ability to manage problems jointly. 
Nordpolitikk has to play out such aims. Thus, in 1992, Norden (and the other members of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)) committed itself to a line of 
action within which it would jointly strive to influence the social and economic causes at the 
root of international and internal conflicts through solidarity, stability and sustainable security 
(ibid.: p.19). 
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6.4 The Environment 
Sustainable security from environmental catastrophe has been one of the prime reasons 
for co-operation in the Arctic. The 1986 Chernobyl disaster had provided, for those who really 
needed it, firm assurance that environmental problems transcended national boundaries, and 
that the legacy of the Soviet regime was immense. Since Norway considered this as much a 
European problem as her own, relations with the EU were important as a result. Working on 
the principle that a problem shared is a problem halved, both Finland and Norway were keen to 
entice Russia into proper environmental assessment and clean-up co-operation agreements as 
soon as they could, to act against such threats as nuclear contamination and acid rain. The 
~ 
1992 Russo-Norwcegian Ministerial Declaration on the environment further proclaimed that, 
"ministers recognise that solving the existing major transboundary environmental problems will 
be central in realising the potential for broader co-operation in the Barents Region ... " (Schram 
Stokke, 1994a: p.151). 
One of the primary aims in launching the BEAR was to involve a broader range of 
governmental institutions than previously in this process, both 'horizontally' and 'vertically'. 
A new, high-level, politically visible agenda from which discussions could take place was 
thereby created, and, through promoting transnational ties between sub-national organisations, 
it was anticipated that organisations' standing on their domestic base, both in environmental 
and industrial matters, would be improved. Already, comparative Soviet openness in 
environmental information had awakened a degree of local consciousness, and the first' green' 
Russian organisations gained political momentum after the Murmansk Speech, as it identified 
the northern environment as a key political issue. 
The BEAR may, therefore, be far from being an environmental organisation, hut it still 
bolsters political commitments, and nurtures the build-up of consensual knowledge (Schram 
Stokke, 1994a: p.156). Thus Sweden, Finland and the EU were similarly keen (if not obliged -
Europe's most important fishing grounds and protein resources are to be found in this area 
(Godal, 1995b)) to become involved, and a Barents Region Environmental Action Programme 
(BREAP) and Task Force were agreed upon in June 1994 at the first meeting of the Council's 
Environment Ministers. 
A range of environmental problems has been experienced to date in the BEAR, not least 
because Russian priorities are not always in line with Nordic ones. The Russian lack of regard 
for the environment can be seen, for example, at the nickel smelting plants of Nikel and 
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Monchegorsk, where over 700 sq. km. of land have been totally destroyed. Sulphur dioxide 
emissions there are over five times that of the whole of Norway (Nilsen, 1994: p.46). The 
Kola Peninsula also contains the world's highest concentration of nuclear installations (not to 
mention testing grounds), and the Russians' operational safety levels, storage and disposal of 
waste are highly questionable (Bjerke, 1994: p.5). But the switch to more environmentally-
friendly alternatives demands international know-how, technology and capital, as well as 
substantial investment (Wiberg, 1994: p.29). This high price is one which many Russians 
believe their economy can ill afford. Moreover, nuclear waste may receive considerable 
attention, but the worst affected areas are not necessarily those in the Barents Region. 
Norwegian efforts to clean up the NW thus require considerable financial 'support' if Russia is 
to recategorise its priorities. 
With Russia's attitude towards developing new nuclear waste management technology 
so ambivalent, it is hardly surprising that little, overall, has been achieved, although the danger 
areas are almost all now monitored. There has been some minor safety investment in the 
Polyarnye Zori plant, and acidic emissions in Kola have declined in recent years, but 
otherwise, no real environmental clean-up has taken place (Schram Stokke, 1994b: p.21). 
Russia's uncertain political climate has made environmental co-operation and even 
assistance increasingly difficult, however. The FSB (ex-KGB) has repeatedly tried to deter the 
spread of information on nuclear data, and, in Autumn 1995, seized files belonging to the 
Norwegian environmental pressure group Bellona. Observers at the time already feared how 
such an atmosphere bode ill for the future of international co-operation (The Sunday Telegraph, 
29 October 1995). 
The extent of the current nuclear threat, therefore, remains unknown, with spent 
nuclear fuel containers still dumped underground and at sea, and outdated and decommissioned 
military and industrial equipment abandoned (Perowne, 1996). The promising era of 
environmental co-operation of 1993 thus appears to have turned quite sour in Russia's 
Northwest. President Yeltsin's 1994 decree to give the Russian nuclear watchdog, 
Gosatomnadzor, powers to inspect naval facilities, had to be rescinded because of strong 
protest from Russian officers (The Guardian, 3 November 1995). The Russian Ministry of 
Environmental Protection and Natural Resources is unashamedly overshadowed by the 
Economy Mihistry, Atomic Energy, and the Navy, hence environmental bureaucracy in Russia 
limits what can be achieved with Norway or anyone else. 
Nevertheless, the Norwegian government's efforts in strengthening co-operation with 
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Russia in order to improve nuclear safety and prevent radioactive pollution have more recently 
resulted in an internal 'Plan of Action'. Projects have been prioritised in four main areas: 
safety standards at nuclear installations; the management and storage of spent fuel and 
radioactive waste; the dumping of waste into rivers and the sea; and arms-related environmental 
hazards (Bjerke, 1995: p.21). 
Offshore, however, despite the different sources of pollution, from nuclear weapons 
testing fallout, and leaking and dumped nuclear fuel, measurements show that radioactive 
pollution in the northern ocean areas is still at low levels for the Northern hemisphere (Ofstad, 
1993: p.3). Fish from the Barents Sea have been found to contain just 1 Bq/kg. of human-
generated radioactivity, whereas the EU safety limit is 600Bq/kg. When environmental 
protection has always been listed at the top of the Norwegian agenda in the Barents Region 
(Hoel, 1994: p.125), such statistics have raised doubts over the real priorities of the 
Norwegian initiative in the BEAR, for although land-based nuclear pollution may be having 
more far-reaching consequences, to sceptical pundits overseas, the stress put on the issue as a 
whole may be seen to have been overplayed. 
Moreover, the fact that most of Northern Scandinavia's airborne pollution was thought 
to blow northeastwards, from Great Britain and Germany, seemed to reinforce this view 
(Heap, 1996, pers. comm.) (although it is also recognised that any pollution inevitably will 
affect photosynthesis in Arctic areas, where there is low biodiversity, low productivity, and a 
low capacity for regeneration (Aanesen, 1993: p.69)). Indeed, the Russians are widely 
considered to have overstated the amounts dumped in the Barents and Kara Seas (Of stad, 
1993.: p.5), perhaps in an effort to attract more foreign aid. What is less easy to explain, 
however, is the Norwegian reaction. In the course of the Kara/Pechora Sea Conference, in 
February 1996, they appeared to some observers to be overly anxious to echo the Russians. 
Whether this was the result of a Nordic zeal to appear to maintain an influence on standards in 
the region, or the Norwegians felt anxious over their leadership of the BEAR, and were 
backing down because they realised they could no longer simply dictate Russia's pace of 
change, remains to be seen. Consequently, only in the Scandinavian sector can high 
environmental awareness and safety levels be assured. In other words, little has effectively 
changed over the past three years. 
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6.5 Social, cultural and indigenous developments 
A further issue linked into the philosophy of the BEAR is the goal of encouraging links 
between people from all cultures and historical backgrounds who live within the same region: 
"stability, good relations and common trust and understanding among neighbours are elements 
of a vision that can only be fulfilled through ... exhausting, practical, day-to-day co-operation 
in such fora as the Barents Co-operation" (Godal, 1995a). However, the Norwegian 
government early on declared its belief in the importance of according a separate role and status 
to the indigenous peoples within the Barents Co-operation. For the Saami (the largest 
indigenous group) in particular, the BEAR has granted new opportunities to establish and re-
establish links with their brethren across the former Iron Curtain. 
Fig. 3: Young Saami women on the Kola Peninsula 
(Bj0rklund, M0ller& Reymert, 19%: front cover) 
However, although the general pace of change in Russia may have been rapid since 
Communism's collapse, the BEAR itself has had little effect on indigenous people's economic 
or political development. A Kola Saami Association was established independently (in 1989), 
to work for social and economic development and further the Saami traditions and lifestyle,just 
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as the Nordic organisations aim to do. The Kola Saami have also been voicing the right to their 
own parliament, and are demanding stronger political action in the defence of traditional rights 
in Murmansk Oblast. Yet they are only 1,700 in number, in an area of l. lm (Andreev & 
Olsson, 1994: p.206). Furthermore, in the BEAR as a whole, their political position has been 
weakened, when compared to the population total of the North Calotte (Kakonen, 1996: p.82). 
Chaturvedi (1996a: p.190) poses the question of whether the BEAR will ever gain the 
upper hand in decision-making at the regional (rather than state) level. He also asks, in 
typically subaltern school style, whether it will usher in a new era for the Saami, in ensuring 
their 'full and effective participation' in a new political unit. But Saami awareness and 
enthusiasm are not great, and opinion is divided as to how the Saami will benefit (ibid.), 
especially when it is so difficult to see any specific Russian northern policies regarding the 
minorities, even when, as in Murmansk, there are two officials on the administration for 
indigenous matters (Rantala, 1996, pers. comm.). 
One of the major concerns of all indigenous people in the BEAR is the utilisation of 
natural resources. The President of the Norwegian Saami Assembly has acknowledged that the 
BEAR gives indigenes a real opportunity to become involved in safeguarding their own 
interests through economic development (Godal, 1995b). In practice, however, only the 
Norwegian Saami are particularly keen to become involved, and it is a Norwegian who 
represents all Saami at the Barents level. The Saami Council decided that national Saami 
parliaments were the appropriate bodies with which the BEAR should work, but the Swedish 
Saami parliament has showed only a passing interest, and the Finnish none at all (Rantala, 
1996, pers. comm.). The General Secretary of the Saami Council, Leena Aikio, has also 
commented that the Saami are very lazy in taking part in the different working group meetings 
of the Barents Council (ibid.). Only the Saami women's group, Sdrdhkka, has a region-wide 
programme, although there are suggestions that this is because the BEAR is viewed as simply 
another stage in colonisation (Helander, 1996: p.299). Consequently, the latest suggestion has 
been for an indigenous people's authority, equal to the Barents and Regional Councils, to make 
the BEAR a more representative, tripartite structure (ibid.: p.303). 
On the other hand, indigenous rights have not been neglected in Finland, for it was the 
Finnish government which signed a European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in 
1994, and a Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 1995. A 
supplementary protocol is now being devised to deal with cultural rights (Finnish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, 1995: p.21). 
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In Sweden, a small minority like the Saami is believed to be much more effective 
through staying outside the political assemblies, in trying to influence politicians and the media 
from without, rather than participating formally in the decision-making process (Johansson & 
Myrlund, 1992: p.218). Hence there is no priority given to Saami political questions in current 
political programmes - but then they do only form 0.25% of the Swedish population (ibid.: 
p.215). Any Saami campaigning at a national level has therefore concentrate.} on arenas in 
which they can gain most for their traditional livelihood, ie. reindeer herding. 
Politicisation along ethnic lines is perhaps more noticeable in Kola than Scandinavia, 
simply because the few Saami who do remain, are almost all still involved in herding. In 
Lovozero rayon, in Murmansk Oblast, where unemployment is currently -60%, and the 
promise of Western tourism has not developed, the traditional Saami lifestyle offers an 
economic alternative, through private reindeer herding and craftsmanship. Saami Council aid 
schemes have already been distributed, but, in an area where profitability attracts bitterness 
(and poaching) it is not surprising that the Kola Saami Association is campaigning for the 
establishment of a distinct Saami district within the region (Rasmussen, 1995: p.55). There 
are, however, already claims that the Saami are becoming more distinct from the Komi, and 
any tensions only add to the political and economic instability inherent in the Russian sector of 
the BEAR. 
The only certain point in Saami affairs appears to be that indigenous issues remain 
national, rather than wider regional issues. (Opinion polls also indicated that the Saami were 
even less enthusiastic about joining the EU than were other voters (Airoldi, 1995: p.47).) The 
BEAR, to date, has clearly had minimal use for the Saami. However, there has been 
considerable success in cultural issues at the wider level. 
The importance of academic co-operation, for example, was enshrined in the Kirkenes 
Declaration, which emphasised the need to exchange information and share technology, as well 
as to systematise and co-ordinate research. Much of this had already been suggested by 
Gorbachev in this 1987 Murmansk Initiative, to deal with the region's problems, but now the 
reasoning was not so explicit, as educational co-operation, academic and scientific research and 
exchange programmes in universities across the Barents Region were encouraged for their own 
sake. These schemes have now been operating for some years, in the guise of the 'Barentsplus 
Co-operation'. Over 1,000 Russians have been educated in Northern Norway as a direct result 
of the Barents region initiative (Tunander, 1996, pers. comm.). On the other hand, once 
again, much is due more to enlarging the Calotte ('Nordplus') co-operation, than being new 
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because of the BEAR. Nevertheless, speaking recently at the Troms!Z) University Barents 
Conference, the Norwegian Secretary of State said she believed it "foolish to underestimate the 
positive contribution research and education make to regional co-operation" (Bjerke, 1996). 
Quite what this role will be worth, the rest of the world waits to see. 
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7 .0 The Euro-Arctic in the European and the Circumpolar Context 
7.1 Looking North, looking South 
Once the government in Oslo had pledged itself to attempting to join the EU for the fifth 
time, Norway was keen to try to balance the EU's interest in Southern Europe (as witnessed by 
Brussels' Mediterranean Economic Development Aid package (MEDA), and free trade 
agreements) with that in the North. EU involvement in the Arctic could establish a privileged 
channel of diplomatic and economic relations with Russia, enhance European standing, and 
contribute towards defusing the environmental, especially nuclear, threat to the continent 
(Airoldi, 1995: p.46). An Arctic 'region' also fitted in with the 'Europe of the Regions' 
philosophy then emerging to counter the widespread perception that overzealous centralisation 
and universalisation policies were pervading Western European politics. 'Subsidiarity' was 
thus promoted from Brussels, in order to permit certain issues to be regulated at a level more 
appropriate than supranationally. Almost paradoxically, the term 'Euro-Arctic ' stemmed at 
least in part from the desire to attach peripheral northernmost Europe more firmly to 
mainstream European thinking. It therefore stressed the novelty and uniqueness of an area 
which was largely soon to have become part of the European Union (cf. above, pp.14-15). 
At one stage, it was suggested that "if North Norwegians persist in their massive 
scepticism to EU membership, a Faeroes/Greenland solution 19 ••. may be an alternative. This 
is by no means attractive to Oslo, but it will have to be considered... [This] would probably 
guarantee a Norwegian majority in favour of EU membership, and it would give the people in 
the North the right to the fisheries resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone, as well as 
underlining the relative autonomy already exercised in the Barents Region" (Tunander, 1994: 
p.41). Pragmatism and hindsight suggest, however, that a North-South division in any of the 
BEAR member countries remains as unlikely today as it ever was, and especially not in a 
nation as prosperous (and, therefore, influential) as Norway. 
On the other hand, in the light of Norway's having rejected EU membership, it has 
been questioned how much her policies have anything more than 'interesting symbolic effects' 
in international political terms (Sydnes, 1995: p.11 ). Opponents of the EU had always argued 
19 Neither the Faeroe Islands nor Greenland (both constituent parts of Norway's neighbour, Denmark) belong to 
the European Union. Each state ha<; its own parliament and Home Rule govemment'i, which chose to withdraw 
from the European Free Trade Association (EFT A) and the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1972 and 
1985 respectively. However, each state also has a strong sense of national identity differing from that of the 
motherland through history, culture, livelihoods and language. To date, the possibility of a unitary state being 
split in its membership of an organisation such as the EU is unprecedented. 
58 
,
11 
\~ 
" 'I lj, d 
! I r 
i' 
I. 
I' 
II 11 
II :I 
I' i' I 
ii I I • 
!I .JI 
that the country's influence would increase as a 'neutral' non-member, as Norway became an 
international 'bridge-builder'. Yet Norway's ability to build alliances is increasingly dependent 
on the degree of co-ordination within the EU, and EU policy co-ordination in turn varies from 
one issue to the next (ibid.). Thus the EU issue has reactivated the centre-periphery/North-
South conflict across the Nordic countries, even if the BEAR has a new role which differs 
markedly from the official Nordic Euro-orientation. 
Officially, Denmark, Sweden and Finland appear more than satisfied with their impact 
on EU policies, and with EU impact in the UN. Consequently, they have less time for separate 
(and, some might say, superfluous) meetings with Norway to determine today's Nordic 
position. Sydnes therefore takes on the stance of the political Jeremiah, to argue that the idea 
of any increase in Norwegian influence as a neutral is "a misconception, [for] Norwegian 
strategy must now rely ... on the ability to come up with the best ideas and arguments. 
Unfortunately, good ideas are not always what it takes to have an impact" (ibid.). 
Norway's best policy, in this sense, was undoubtedly the Barents Euro-Arctic Region. 
Initially, Norway's Nordic neighbours were almost as enthusiastic for the scheme's success, 
as was the European Union. Thus, in addition to the Regional Council's Barents Programme, 
the EU border regions programme, INTERREG20, becomes operative this year, with Norway 
to participate on an equal footing with Sweden and Finland (which nations benefit from EU 
subsidies) (Bjerke, 1996). This means that EU efforts to develop the BEAR will be made for 
the first time (Commission of the European Communities, 1994: p.35). The INTERREG 
North Calotte Programme will therefore complement the EU's TACIS programme for NW 
Russia, as TACIS funds attempts to restructure state industries from military to civilian 
production. 
Since the BEAR's inception, in 1993, however, and because of European Union 
activity, Norwegian diplomats have been known to be considerably frustrated by their more 
immediate neighbours' lack of enthusiasm in Arctic (especially Barents) affairs, and in 
particular by their lack of political and economic commitment. Part of the reason for this, is 
that the Barents Region is still not producing many tangible results. Norway's and Russia's 
political futures may, therefore, lie as much in relations with other Arctic states, as in their 
relations with the rest of Europe. 
20 The INTERREG scheme aims to overcome the relative isolation of border areas in national economies, 
through the appropriate channelling of development funds, in an effort to respond to new opportunities for co-
operation with third countries, thereby increasing trade to mutual advantage, and decreasing visible barriers 
between EU and non-EU countries. 
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7 .0 The Euro-Arctic in the European and the Circumpolar Context 
7 .2 Looking East, looking West 
The Cold War divided the world into two opposing parties and held both parties unified 
and united. This bipolar world happened to be split East-West across the Arctic. But the 
Arctic is now emerging as a region in its own right, with its own unique problems and needs 
(see Map 11). It is therefore not unreasonable to argue that a growing awareness of a northern 
identity exists in the circumpolar region. While the process of regionalization proceeds 
latitudinally (ie. on the circumpolar plane), however, political and trading relations across the 
Arctic proceed faster meridionally, (ie. North-South), in both EU and NAFT A2 I 
arrangements. The political map of the North is changing rapidly. What is more, the process 
of political devolution has accelerated, and even indigenous politicians are involved in 
international activities. These changes present metropolitan governments both with 
opportunities and problems which are best addressed in a focussed, regional context. 
As internal pressures have increased in importance vis-a-vis international ones, 
political thinking has changed in favour of regionalization. This has occurred both within 
unified states, where various functions are appropriated, and between them, as new co-
operative ventures are established. Such a process might lead an area towards greater 
autonomy, or even towards independence as a region state (Kakonen, 1996: p.71). The Euro-
Arctic is not thought to be in a position to gain all that much from the EU or its regional policy 
when it is so sparsely inhabited (compared to the poorer southern peripheries), even though 
Sweden and Finland do have special status for their territories above 60°N (Heininen et al., 
1995: p.142). Therefore, regional and sub-regional circumpolar co-operation seems equally (if 
not more) logical to many inhabitants of the Arctic, than does looking southwards. American 
political geographers writing in 'The Los Angeles Times', in August 1992, were not jesting 
when they predicted that many of the northerly peripheries of the Arctic states would thus 
eventually secede, even in Arctic Europe. Lacking political power, such states would then 
have to confederate in an entity such as the BEAR (ibid.). 
The underlying aim in regional co-operation in the BEAR, however, is to advance a 
decentralised international system, to support sustainable development, and to preserve the 
culture and society of a distant periphery into the future, both in a European and a pan-Arctic 
way: "in this sense, the Arctic could be an experimental laboratory for a new post-Cold War 
21 The North American Free Trade Association is comprised of Canada, the USA and Mexico. 
60 
1: 
jl 
lj 
11 1 
international system" (Heininen et al., 1995: p.135). There also remains something of a vague 
hope that the BEAR will one day belong to a new Arctic 'Mediterranean' community, or as part 
of a Co-operating Region of the Arctic (CORA), although this is unlikely for several decades 
(ibid.). 
Map 11: The BEAR in a circumpolar perspective (Holst, 1993: p.66) 
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Looking East and West in the meantime, there are problems enough even in attempting 
to establish the Arctic Council. Russian politics have also to stabilise somewhat before the 
BEAR or any other co-operative regimes can become truly successful, for Russian disarray is 
at the crux of most problems currently extant in the Arctic. Efforts have already been made to 
involve Russia in NATO, although the preferred Nordic solution would probably be to 
demilitarise an area such as the North Calotte/BEAR, along similar lines to the demilitarisation 
of Svalbard. 
Finally, several of the regional members of the BEAR belong, too, to the territorial 
Arctic organisation, the Northern Forum (although participation by no means overlaps)22. The 
BEAR may thus be only one way in which regional governments are facing the future in the 
Arctic. But it is also the scheme of most relevance to the rest of Europe. It is, therefore, to a 
critical assessment of the BEAR's functioning overall that we in the West must now tum. 
22 Currently, the Regional Authority of Northern Norway is a member of the Northern Forum, as is Lappland 
and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug. Murmansk and Archangelsk Oblasti, Karelia and Norbotten are not 
members, since they believe their economic future lies at a regional, rather than circumpolar level. The more 
southerly Swedish county of Vasterbotten does belong to the Forum, however, largely because it believes it is 
one of the few ways in which ft can gain national, and therefore international, attention (Tornberg, 1996, pers. 
comm.). At the time of the establishment of the BEAR, the governments of both Vasterbotten, and its Finnish 
neighbour, Oulu district, wished to belong to the new region, but their applications were rejected by their more 
northerly neighbouring authorities, on the grounds that the North already received too little political or 
economic investment, and a territorial expansion of the Barents Region would only dilute that further (ibid.). 
There was also a question of balance to consider, with regard to Russia. Any regional border alterations today 
would have to be voluntarily accepted by all regional players. 
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8.0 Assessing the BEAR: Has the dream gone sour? 
The relative success of the BEAR is hard to gauge. It is impossible to determine how 
the region would have performed in the past three years were it not for the government funding 
it has received, although it is unlikely to have fared any better economically. However, region-
building also requires a degree of political commitment which is, in the author's opinion, 
visibly lacking in vital areas of national government. The fact that Norway has had to raise the 
issues she wanted discussed for the Barents Region at the Baltic Region's Visby Summit23, 
perhaps says more on this subject than anything else. 
Being a regional arrangement, the BEAR must primarily serve the interests of all its 
inhabitants if it is to be favourably judged. Officially, the Norwegian government is pleased 
with the speed of change. But the BEAR cannot afford to please simply the politicians of the 
respective capital cities, however much it may be that politicians today shape the futures of 
most regional, national and supranational organisations. 
Norway continues to set considerable store by her co-operation with Russia in the 
Barents Region, despite the growing frustration with her more immediate political partners. 
The Russians are anxious to reciprocate, partly, perhaps, because Kozyrev is elected to the 
Duma Murmansk voters. At the private level, however, the experience of Scandinavian 
businessmen trying to invest across the border has not been uniformly successful. Although 
Kozyrev is also chairman of the Russian-Norwegian Trade Commission, project co-operation 
is not developing particularly quickly, not least because of the military. The mutual benefits of 
co-operation may yet be great, but the region clearly still suffers from the legacy of the Soviets. 
Another part of the problem with the BEAR is that there has been a change of emphasis 
in looking across the East-West border since the end of the Cold War. Eyeing what lies over 
the frontier has now become of more interest to those in the West than in the East, as the 
Scandinavian authorities devise strategies to prevent a refugee exodus, smuggling or 
criminality (whilst simultaneously keeping relations open), in order to encourage long-term 
political, economic, ecological and demographic stability across the region. 
Norway has, therefore, always admitted that the BEAR is not limited to the 
development of the region itself, but that it constitutes a significant element in Norwegian 
domestic and foreign policy, in tum part of a wider European process which involves the 
23 The Visby Summit was the first full-scale intergovernmental meeting for the Baltic Sea Region, and was 
held on 3rd May 1996, in the former chief city of the Hanseatic League. 
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creation of new structures of co-operation across the old Iron Curtain. In all cases, says Bjerke 
(19%), "the aim is to create a climate of mutual trust and a sense of purpose, by setting 
common goals for economic development by establishing political structures where 
representatives from both sides of the old East-West divide can meet." 
What worries some observers, however, is that Russians will not be able to adapt to 
Western thinking, having always lived in a society of strong centre-periphery polarisation, 
formal production plans, central governance, monopolisation, isolationism, and the passive 
employee mentality. Designing effective East-West co-operation models in light of this is 
clearly not straightforward (Wiberg, 1994: p.30). 
Yet, from a Nordic perspective, it has become increasingly difficult to maintain the idea 
that Norden is a semi-isolated region of the world where post-war welfarism and state 
structures can be maintained indefinitely, independent of events elsewhere, and despite ever-
rising costs. Finland and Sweden have tied in their economic futures with the thirteen other 
countries of the EU. On the other hand, Norway has chosen a future on the periphery of the 
European Union, which she can maintain only through her disproportionally strong economy. 
And although Jacques Del ors cited the BEAR as a prime example of regional co-operation, no 
Commissioner has ever partaken in its ministerial meetings (Airoldi, 1995: p.40). The future 
strength of the BEAR therefore relies upon Norwegian enthusiasm for a Norwegian project. 
Originally, the Norwegian government devised a northern policy innovative in three 
respects: as a reflection of a new Norwegian European policy; as a new aspect of post-Soviet 
policy (in inviting Russia to co-operate in a limited regional context without scaring Moscow 
into believing this was a sign of support for separatism); and in the signs of erosion in 
Norwegian-Atlantic ties (Kakonen, 1994: p.185). Yet it is the Baltic Sea Region which has set 
a precedent for commercial and government relations, taking the concept of regionalism as a 
point of departure in a way the Barents Euro-Arctic Region and the restructuring of the Russian 
Arctic have been slower to adopt. 
Thus, enthusiasm for the BEAR seems to have waned at the moment, because what 
was anticipated has not been fully achieved. Norway aimed to normalise and stabilise East-
West relations: to counteract and reduce military tension, to lower environmental threats, to 
boost the whole region's.economy, and, through regionalization, to create a multilateral 
framework for co-operation as part of a wider trend in Europe (Holst, 1994: p.12). In each of 
these areas, there have been shortcomings. For the Norwegian government, the Barents 
Region co-operation was the first major post-Cold War step towards a proper strategy 
64 
I I 
I 
specifically designed for Europe's northern periphery. The civilian sector in NW Russia may 
be unlikely to look such a gift horse in the mouth, but extremists and the military prefer to think 
of it as a Trojan one. Which. probably leaves the real worth of the BEAR to be valued by 
domestic Norwegian opinion, and the policy-makers of Sweden and Finland. 
In assessing the worth of the BEAR today, therefore, to begin with, the common 
security interest remains apparent, but the process is by no means straightforward, and it has 
had no immediate results. The Norwegian Foreign Minister always knew it would need at least 
a decade to take effect (cf. Stoltenberg, 1994), but, in the meantime, attention easily turns 
elsewhere to more important issues. 
Secondly, Europe has reached a time of apprehension now, and the general security 
context is far from being sorted, even if it is becoming more necessary as Russia is more 
preoccupied by domestic affairs. The state of Norwegian-Russian relations are at times 
questionable, although Norway no longer feels so insecure as to whether the Americans' deeds 
will match their words, in light of US involvement in Europe in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Archer, 
19%, pers. comm.). But although the BEAR has provided a convenient starting point for 
deepening relations, it has also paradoxically weakened the reasons for wanting it in the first 
place (ie. as a multilateral partnership), since Norway is now confident enough to enter 
relations with Russia alone, because even if she cannot always get what she wants, she knows 
she will now be protected. Norway can act bilaterally because of the multilateral context the 
BEAR provides (ibid.). In Sweden, similarly, the lack of a perceived threat has resulted in 
large-scale military cutbacks in the North, even as Finland augments her forces. 
Thirdly, Norway has not joined the EU, and the EU has not gained any Arctic territory. 
Since the BEAR was originally Norway's initiative, Sweden and Finland have been quite 
content to let aspects of it drop quietly by the wayside, as their political and· financial 
commitments turn towards the South of the continent. The Swedish Ministry argues that this is 
because there are simply different ways of dealing with the same problems, and that different 
rules, centralised (rather than local) funding and private enterprise regulations will ultimately 
result in the same outcome (Tomberg, 1996, pers. comm.). On the other hand, since Norway 
had always made it clear who would command the Barents initiative, any perceived lack of 
success outside Norden only widens a vicious circle. Sweden would thus willingly consider 
some form of amalgamation of the Baltic Region with the BEAR (ibid.). Bearing in mind that 
the forthcoming Barents Council meeting is to be attended by the EU charge from Moscow, 
and not Oslo (,t\.rcher, 1996, pers. comm.), Brussels is, in the author's opinion, apparently 
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a peculiarly Northern issue. 
Fourthly, internally, the Norwegians are still using the BEAR as a sweetener to 
northern inhabitants, putting their political and economic interests in a wider context than the 
region would otherwise deserve. But the predicted economic gains are slow to arrive, except 
through smuggling (eg. Russian cod into the EEA). Furthermore, although certain business 
deals are working well, there are others which have met unexpected problems, and, as they do 
so (eg. in fishery disputes such as that between Norwegians and Icelanders in 1993 and 1994), 
they might decrease the interest of local people, hence governments, in further co-operation 
(Heininen, 1996: p.153). 
Fifthly, state control of the utilisation of resources (through the control of spending 
priorities, infrastructure requirements, and the regulation of conditions for resource 
exploitation) is believed to result in an area of minimal goods or wealth retention, thereby 
limiting the BEAR's potential as anything more than a 'gateway' (Chaturvedi, 1996a: p.191). 
Russian centre-based colonial practices also ensure that the functioning of the market economy 
is still hampered at the periphery, so local authorities have to direct much of their energy into 
protecting regional interests against the internal process of change. 
This situation may be highlighted, for example, by the introduction of export duties on 
iron concentrate from Kola, which effectively prevented any transfrontier trade (Castberg et al., 
1994: p.79). The oblast administration then had to devote its energies to proving to Moscow 
what ill effects this was having, before it could get the export fee reduced, rather than 
concentrating upon more immediate issues, or upon the tackling of other major legal and excise 
deficiencies in the BEAR's Russian sector. Thus, although there are isolated Russian outposts 
successfully integrating with the Nordic economies, they are appearing more than anything else 
as (neo-)colonial outposts in an area devoid of any certain future at the present (Archer, 1996, 
pers. comm.). 
Sixthly, although the BEAR is working well enough at the Regional level of meetings, 
and much has been made of the increase in border crossings and administrative and cultural 
contacts since its inception (cf. Godal, 1995b); it is hardly proper integration, as envisaged in 
the Norwegians' goals for the Barents Region co-operation. This could, at least in part, be due 
to the conflict in understanding inherent from the beginning, when observers such as 
Veggeland believed that the region "lacks the unifying inspiration necessary to mobilise and 
act. .. It lacks a common identity. Its future is therefore very dependent on its being able to 
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establish itself as an effective functional region" (1993: p.45). This lack of belief in a regional 
identity therefore contrasted with the Norwegian government's position, and its hopes for the 
success of cultural contacts. More recently, the fundamental aim has been reiterated, to "ensure 
that these contacts are being utilised to establish co-operation projects that [really] will 
contribute to sustainable economic growth, the creation of jobs and improvement in the living 
conditions of the people of the region" (Bjerke, 1996). 
Finally, and perhaps of particular note, the BEAR has, to some extent, turned the 
tables, to become more of an internal North-South divide rather than an East and West one. 
For Norway, and, to a lesser extent Russia, are trying to sustain the dynamism of the scheme, 
in the face of Finland and Sweden. On the other hand, the EU' s trade barriers have reinforced 
the distinction between East and West, as Sweden and Finland have been harmonised (and 
Norway adjoins through the EEA). This leaves a gaping difference in Russia, which itself is 
far from being a unitary region, even within the confines of the BEAR. Kozyrev may have put 
much of his personal reputation on the line at its outset, because he believed in the region, but 
there has been no integration in the sense of the EU, or even in legal or trade systemisation. 
Thus, three years into the Barents scheme, the assessment of the merits of co-operation 
has been somewhat overcast by an air of despondency and scepticism. Questions are being 
asked in the Nordic countries as to the scheme's realistic chances of medium-term success, and 
to the costs of becoming so deeply involved with NW Russia. For although it may have taken 
several attempts to jump-start other international bodies (like the EU), in the face of Europe's 
other regional arrangements, the BEAR is underperforming. Moreover, there is some alarm at 
present in the West that Russia is not transforming as fast, nor along quite the right lines, as 
policy-makers had hoped. Hence sceptics argue over the degree to which Russian 
collaboration and co-operation (eg. in environmental matters) is just great power arrogance 
dressed up in new garb. This, and the degree to which the increased attraction of Europe has 
left room in Nordic calculations for any security co-operation on a circumpolar basis, may 
probably be better judged in the light of the June 1996 Russian elections. 
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9.0 Conclusion 
As has been emphasized throughout this thesis, finding the right balance between 
continuity and change has had a fundamental role in the creation and functioning of the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Region, and today, three and a half years after its launch, the BEAR remains far 
from becoming an integrated entity. National foreign and domestic policy goals have been 
played out through the Barents co-operation, certainly in Norway, and to the region's tangible 
advantage in Russia, although governments in Stockholm and Helsinki have been far more 
cautious and selective in their approach towards a specific Barents Region Nordpolitikk. 
Economic, hence political, stability in the Barents Region is fundamental to the security 
of Northern Europe. This was a major force behind the wider international interest shown at 
the time of the Kirkenes Declaration. Inverting this concept, it has also been apparent that 
regional economic or social success is greatly affected by wider commitments. Security today 
is thus interpreted in the broadest sense, as national political goals have universally changed in 
favour or against new superstructures or subsidiarity. Left without the East-West threat, there 
4 
is less to bind nations together. Cross-border regionalism has therefore developed, ;(.nd 
governments have been compelled to choose either to follow or to pre-empt these trends. 
The four Barents Council member states have clearly chosen the latter direction. The 
lack of momentum within the BEAR, therefore, stems largely from differing interpretations as 
to how best to drive the scheme forward, and where national priorities must lie, rather than in a 
rejection of co-operation. It is thus, that governmental consideration for the North is as much 
affected, for example, by NATO, as it is, to, say, unemployment levels within the region. 
The BEAR has without doubt proved itself as a window between East and West. But 
the amount of political and economic investment cannot as yet be seen to have paid off to 
mutual advantage, when wider concerns continue to dominate regional issues. The best 
solution for the region may therefore rest in balancing some form of condominium against 
North European fears of marginalisation. 
National boundaries will inevitably still exist in the future, but although they are 
expected to become less important, that is no reason to expect a loss of sovereignty: the Barents 
Region is not an autonomous region, and probably never will be. The BEAR is essentially a 
simple hybrid of regionality at the internal and international level. How much it will be 
possible to integrate East and West within its structure, as a result, is debatable. That there will 
continue to be integration in one sense or another seems universally accepted, if not always 
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encouraged. The issue today therefore concerns the methods and ultimate goals of the process, 
and how and where this process is going. Doubtless, there will be changes in the character of 
.. 
most nations, regions and municipalities, their institutions, economic and political life 
(Dellenbrant & Olsson, 1994: p.9), but theorists prefer to foresee less the dismemberment of 
states, than a loose regional economic collaboration (ibid: p.11). 
Certainly there is no question of redrawing national borders in the Euro-Arctic (not just 
because of the security risks, political weakness,or lack of ethnic justification, but also because 
of the burden that territory has become: even Svalbard and the Kola Peninsula lost much of 
their vital strategic significance as soon as the Cold War finished). On the other hand, 
Kakonen (1996: p.83) suggests that the BEAR's current East-West inequality can be best 
overcome by the integration of Oulu and Vasterbotten, since, according to the Japanese, Ohmae 
(1993, p.80), such regions (of over five million people) have the best chances to integrate 
directly in the world economy, and will have a good base size for economic growth. As it 
stands, financially, the region remains dependent upon the South (eg. in welfare, healthcare 
and schooling) which makes it complicated to aim for self-reliant development. Moreover, in 
Kola, modernisation has depended wholly upon state subsidies, and now Moscow requires 
financial justification for all spending. Central-level involvement must thus be expected. 
But governments recognise that, after three years of dismantling old divides, 
organising, and establishing contacts, the time is ripe to start up projects that will produce clear 
local results, in industry, infrastructure and the environment. 
Yet the international changes making this possible have also been accompanied by key 
elements of continuity. For although the Cold War has passed, tacit threats remain, and almost 
regardless of the BEAR, the lack of border security, the potential for violent Russian civil 
strife, the appearance of grqund-level politics, and the continued deployment of nuclear 
strategic submarines all look set to continue (Heininen, 1996: p.147). When set in the original 
context of the BEAR, the question that has to be asked, is whether there is reaily much to 
separate the forecast healthy 'competition in co-operation' from Cold War 'co-ordinated 
competition' (ibid.: p.151). 
Hence the BEAR can be seen simply as a logical response to the demand for apparent 
innovation that the post-Cold War situation in Europe demanded. This has largely been to the 
credit of forward-thinking officials in the government departments in Norway. Her 
government's plan of action for nuclear issues and close contacts with Russia have also proved 
to be of interest to others, to grant useful co-operation, in turn, with the USA, France and 
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Brussels in particular (Godal, 1996). Since the policies of individual states are seldom 
adequate for solving economic, technological, social and environmental problems, so cross-
border challenges can only be met through these, and other, international steering mechanisms. 
Nordpolitikk has therefore become synonymous with all levels of contextual politics, 
hence there are no singularly northern policies (eg. for Arctic trade, or regional unity), when 
the BEAR serves as a convenient functional hotchpotch primed for such developments. Its 
success to date may have been ambiguous, but on paper, at least, the value of the BEAR cannot 
be questioned. For Barents regionalization has begun to integrate the Arctic peripheries into 
global systems, both with and without the regulations imposed by national centres. This calls 
into question the role of northern inhabitants, in the face of the capitals, although the scheme 
cannot, in its present structure, exist without governmental input. There thus seems to remain, 
in fact, little more than the need for a popularly elected Barents Parliament, if the original wish 
of the elites for a truly viable and dynamic region is going to be logically fulfilled. Perhaps this 
will be the way to carry Nordpolitikk to its natural conclusion in northernmost Europe in the 
wake of the Cold War. 
Fig. 4: Moving slowly ever forward: reindeer migrating through Lappland 
(Barentssekretariatet, 1994: p.5) 
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Appendix A 
Results of the referendum on EU membership in Lappland (by district): 
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Total %age in favour: Finland: 57% 
Sweden: 52.3% 
Norway: 47.7% 
against: 43% 
against: 47.7% 
against: 52.3%* 
* ie. a 0.6% swing in favour since the previous referendum, 22 years earlier 
(Lapin Llilininhailirtis (Provincial Government of Lappland), 1996) 
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(74% turnout) 
(data unavailable) 
(88.8% turnout) 
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Appendix B 
Election results for NW Russia in December 1993 
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Appendix C 
Map to show the extent of territorial waters, the Svalbard box. and the disputed Russo-
Norwegian maritime boundary in the Barents Sea 
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AppendixD1 
The Barents Region as an Emerging Market: Land area, population density and human life 
expectancy by sex in the Barents Region (1993) 
The Barents Region 
Regio,n 
Nordland 
Tro.ms 
Finn.mark 
Notrbotten 
Lapland 
MU rmansk Obla st 
ArkhangeJskOblast 
Republi,c of Karelia 
Area, km2 
38327 
25981 
48 637 
105 500 
98937 
144 900 
587 400 
180 520 
1)31.12J993 • 2l lnhabitants perkm2: 
36302 
25 121 
45879 
98911 
93 057 
133 657 
156 881 
Population 1.1.1994 
240 694 
149 745 
76 459 
1) 267 092 
1) 202895 
1109 357 
1 547 391 
793 012 
Inhabitants per 
km2 of land 
6,6 
6 
1,7 
2,7 
2,2 
8 .3 
2) 2,6 
5 ,1 
The total area of Barents Region is 1 230 202 square kilometers and the total population 4 390 000 inhabitants. 
Thus the area of the North Calotte account for approximately one fourth of the total area and the population one 
fifth of the total population of the Barents Region. 
Mortality has risen ~onsiderably in the Whole North-West Russia during the last few years. A particularly 
alarming trend is that the male life expectancy has fallen below 60 years. 
(Finnish Statistical Office, WWW) 
76 
t 
11 
II 
' 
,j 
'I 
• I 
I 
' 
Appendix D2 
The Barents Region as an Emerging Market: The structure of industry, 1990, 1992, 1993 
/ I 
The economy of North-West Russia is highly dependent on industrial production. In the North Calotte, on the I 
other hand, the service sector has evolved into the most important means of employment and a source of regional I 
~~ i 
The GDP figures are from 1990 (Norway) andfrom 1992. In Sweden the first regional GDP figures will be 
available in spring 1996. Figures of employed persons are from 199 3. 
(Finnish Statistical Office, WWW) 
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The structure of industry, cont. 
Lapland 
rrous and 
n-ferrous 
etals 35% 
;,hangelsk Oblast 
Murmansk Oblast 
Other 6% 
Electrical 
products 2% Food 
uildings industry 24 % 
materials 2% 
ood and 
beverages 9% 
Electricity 14% 
Republic of Kare Ii a 
industry 3% 
uildings 
materials 3% 
Energy 7% Food industry 6% 
Ferrous 
metals 20% 
Textile and food 
industry 12% 
Other 2% 
Buildings 
materials 3 % 
Machinery, 
equipment 'i% 
Mining and chenl 
industry 7% 
Other 4% 
1restry and metal industry are the most important industries of North-West Russia and the province of Lapland 
(Finnish Statisti~ai Office, WWW) 
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Appendix D3 
The Barents Region as an Emerging Market: NW Russia's main export goods, 1993 
:~ 
f4.urtn:1uisk Oblast 
fleetric pt!.IWer 
lran .. ore 
Nietel 
ta:lcium .phosphate· 
Alu«iin:ium 
Fisln and tl:sm. products 
Roundwo.ocl · 
· Spru·ce 
Pit)e-. 
. '@enurose 
t Cod 
'til!:\~.-;;_"':hS.l!~'.P.K, .. 1n:~, '7-t 
-~·-~----~-------
Uril~ 
llIIOll,t 
11D)t 
'opo t 
1000 t 
1000 t 
1000t 
1000m3' 
1 000 [113 
1 cm. m3 
1 000 m3 
The primary exports from the Republic of Karelia are wood-working products. The main export products of the 
Murmansk Oblast are for example mineral and metal raw materials, as well as energy. During the 1992-1993 
period, the exports of wood-working products developed more favorably in the Republic of Karelia than in the 
Arkhangelsk Oblast. In the Kola Peninsula, the exports of electric power showed the greatest decrease and the 
exports of iron ore the highest increase. No regional foreign trade statistics are available for the Scandinavian 
countries. 
(Finnish Statistical Office, WWW) 
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Appendix D4 
The Barents Region as an Emerging Market: Employed persons by industry, 1993 
fhe table showing the distribution of employees by industry gives a clear picture of regional differences in the 
1dustrial structure of the Barents Region; the most important employers are the service sector in the North 
llllotte and the manufacturing industry in North-West Russia. Another structural difference in the labor force 
1ructure is that construction is as significant an employer in North-West Russia as is trade in the North Calotte. 
(Finnish Statistical Office, WWW) 
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Appendix D5 
The Barents Region as an Emerging Market: Unemployment rates by sex, 1993 
fhe unemployment rate of men is considerably higher than that of women in all parts of the Euro-Arctic Region 
ixcept in North-West Russia. In the North Calotte, more women than men are employed in the public sector, 
•here the employment rate is not as dependent on trade cycles as is in the private sector. 
(Finnish Statistical Office, WWW) 
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